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Cornnittee Report 
When Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist formed this 
\ 
cornnittee, his charge to us was to inquire into "the necessity 
and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay 
and the lack of finality" in capital cases in which the prisoner 
had or had been offered counsel. He specifically directed our 
attention to the fo l lowing issues: (1) better coordination of 
state and federal collateral procedures, (2) exhaustion, (3) 
expediting federal habeas corpus review, (4) a statute of 
limitations for collateral proceedings, and (5) lack of finality 
in the collateral process. lVe have examined statistical 
information, studied case histories, considered many articles 
published in leading journals, solicited and considered the views 
of a broad spectrum of organizations and attorneys interested in 
the area, and conferred extensively. Our report to the 
Conference follows. 
In 1972, Furman v. Georgia allowed states to impose the 
death penalty based on guided jury discretion. In Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976), the Court approved the new Georgia statute that 
provides standards to guide the judge and jury in capital 
cases. Other states imposing the death penalty have adopted 
similar statutes. Since 1972, there have been 101 contested 
executions. The shortest of these judicial proceedings required 
2 years and 9 months to complete. The longest covered a period 
of 14 years and 6 months. The length of the average proceeding 
was 8 years and 2 months. Every trial and direct review 
procedure in these 101 cases was subjected to collateral 
challenge in federal court. 
The cornnittee found that the collateral review process is 
frequently erratic and repetitious. It is always over-long. The 
long separation of sentence and execution hampers justice without 
improving the quality of adjudication. It is routine for federal 
courts to stay state court execution orders, at least during the 
initial habeas corpus proceedings. Last-minute constitutional 
claims very often follow years of collateral attacks. Such last-
minute claims frustrate orderly judicial consideration of issues 
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and denigrate federalism. 
Most states do not offer indigent prisoners the assistance 
of counsel after direct review. Prisoners acting prose rarely 
present promptly or properly exhaust their constitutional 
challenges in the state forum. This results in delayed or 
ineffective federal collateral procedures. Other factors also 
contribute to the present process of difficult and unsatisfactory 
collateral adjudication. Prominent among them is the fact that 
~ 
the Supreme Court has handed down 71 decisions affecting various \ 
phases of death penalty litigation since Furman. Until the 
1 
recent decision in Teague limited the effect of new precedent on 
long pending litigation, a number of these decisions created new 
rules that spawned relitigation of settled collateral issues and 
the pending of such cases delayed the process of adjudication. 
Capital litigation must be improved if the death penalty 
remains a constitutional form of punishment for felony murder. 
The conmittee proposes legislation we think will expedite and 
assure fairness in federal collateral proceedings. The 
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Corrm i ttee' s ana lysis of ca ses f r om Al a bama, F lorida, Georgia, 
Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of the time spent in 
4t- .; ✓/-­
co 11 ate r al litigation in death penalty cases occurs ' outside 
"" 
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t a t e-c"Q,1"1 Eht ,e.r a 1 p r o c e e d 1 n g s . A table showing the average time 
periods and ratios in death penalty cases in these states is 
attached to this report. Underlying data is available from the 
J 
eporter. 
No single reason for this disproportionately high federal 
V 
percentage can be identified. The reconmended legislation is 
designed to achieve a single state proceeding that exhausts all 
issues and, if necessary, is followed by a single federal habeas 
corpus action. To accomplish this goal, w..e..:a.P-e-.c.ww-i-n-e.e 
the petitioner must be represented in state post-conviction 
review by competent counsel who stays with the collateral 7 
proceedings through any federal court habeas corpus litigation. 
This goal can best be achieved with the initiative and 
cooperation of the 37 states that authorize imposition of the 




take steps to make their trial and direct review process in death 
penalty cases as error-free as possible. The states should 
provide competent counsel promptly to indigent petitioners for 
state collateral review. If these steps are taken, federal 
collateral review proceedings also would be expedited. The 
single, well-counseled series of collateral proceedings we 
envision would best ensure that every proper issue is raised and 
decided in an orderly way. 
The legislation we propose to effectuate the one prompt, 
counseled state/federal post-conviction process provides that 
when counsel is appointed by a state for collateral review, a 
statute of limitations would begin to run as to all claims 
cognizable in federal habeas. At this time, an automatic stay of 
execution, if needed, could be obtained. This stay would remain 
in place until all collateral proceedings were completed. The 
prisoner would have six months following the end of state 
collateral review within which to file in federal court. This 
limitation would assure that the presentation of issues will not 
- 5 -
be delayed. Time would be tolled during such state 
proceedings. When state proceedings conclude, the running of 
time would recorrrnence and any federal petition would have to be 
filed within the time period provided or be time-barred unless 
petitioner could show a basis for relief that had not been 
presented, that a substantial question of guilt existed, that new 
and pertinent facts had been found, or that new fundamental 
rights had been developed. Since 28 U.S.C. §§ 1657 and 2243 
already require all federal habeas corpus proceedings to be 
expedited and decided "forthwith" and "surrrnarily," no additional 
legislation requiring priorities for the handling of federal 
habeas corpus proceedings is needed. We do suggest that district 
and courts of appeal expedite consideration of capital cases. 
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August 11, 1989 
(Hew's draft as revised 
by L. F . P. , Jr. ) 
/~ ~ ~ 
Proposed Committee Report ~ 
d:r-ql-d. 
I. Introduction 
studies of public opinion establish 
majority of our citizens favors the death 
~~~ 
rt.. <-I- j- ~ L-A': ~ J-.~.I ~ 
that an overwhelming(Y".o-?'~~J 
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penalty for certain 
/-,r:,~/~lht-
murders. And the Supreme Court has made clear that the evolving 
standards of decency embodied in the 
1--n . ~ /j ,(,(_ 
Eighth Amendment permit 
~~p 
imposition of this punishment for some offenders. Of course, both 
the Court and society have recognized that, because it is 
irreversible, death is a unique punishment. This realization 
demands safeguards to ensure that capital punishment is 
administered with the utmost reliability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-layered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review has led to repetitious litigation and 
years of delay between sentencing and execution. The resulting lack 
2 • 
~ 
of finality frustrates the laws of thirty-seven states and 
undermines public confidence in our criminal justice system. 1 And 
the delay inherent in the present system brings little benefit in 
terms of reliability in sentencing or fair and orderly review of 
constitutional claims. Prisoners often cannot obtain qualified 
counsel until execution is imminent. The resulting last-minute 
rushed litigation disserves inmates, and saps the resources of our 
judiciary. 
To address these problems, Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist formed this committee on _______ , 1988. His charge 
to us was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of 
legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of 
finality" in capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been 
offered counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as members of this 
Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief Judge Roney 
of the Eleventh Circuit, District Court Judge Hodges of Florida and 
1Federal criminal statutes also authorize capital punishment. 
See, e.g., 49 USCA § 14-7(i) (B) (aircraft piracy). 
3 • 
Judge Barefoot Sanders of Texas. The states in the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits have by far the greatest numbers of prisoners 
subject to capital sentences, and each of these judges has had 
extensive experience with federal review of capital cases. The 
chairman of the committee, retired Associate Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., served as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit 
while sitting on the Supreme Court. Professor Albert M. Pearson of 
the University of Georgia, with experience in capital cases, was 
the Reporter for the Committee. William R. Burchill, Jr., General 
Counsel of the Administrative Office, served as Secretary. 
The committee met six times and considered with care the 
problems associated with collateral review of capital sentences. 
We invited written comments from a broad spectrum of interested 
parties and organizations, and received a number of helpful 
presentations. These included the views of state and federal 
prosecutors, groups urging abolition of the death penalty, state 
executives and legislators, and criminal defense and public 
4. 
defender organizations. The responses contributed to our findings, 
which follow and to the formulation of the legislation we propose. 
II. Findings 
A. Delay and Repetition 
The committee identified serious problems with the 
present system of collateral review. The most general of these is 
that the dual system of state and federal collateral review 
engenders repetitious litigation and excessive delay. Few would 
argue that the current state of death penalty administration is 
satisfactory. There are now 2,160(?) convicted murderers on death 
row awaiting execution. Yet since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman 
decision only 112(?) executions have taken place. The shortest of 
these judicial proceedings required two years and nine months to 
complete. The longest covered a period of 14 years and six months. 
The length of the average proceeding was eight years and two 
months. 
~??~~1f, .. >I(:: ... ·:/f£;}:r:/({};:tt/zlf?~-'--t/!-> .,.<.":':-, -1";'\ -: _:·:., :. -.<\ •,, , ,:-~,_::~, .. --;, .. : ,{\:·.-· , ;· .r.' :~:~;_···,. .... -\. .• •· ·· , 
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The committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of the time spent 
in collateral litigation in death penalty cases occurs outside of 
state collateral proceedings. A table showing the average time 
periods and ratios in death penalty cases in these states is 
attached to this report. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well as the 
delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes clear that 
the present system of collateral review operates to frustrate the 
law of 37 states. The collateral review process tends to be erratic 
and frequently is repetitious. The long separation of sentence and 
execution hampers justice without improving the quality of 
adjudication. 2 Because res judicata is inapplicable to federal 
habeas proceedings, many capital litigants return to federal court 
2contrary to what may be assumed, the Constitution does not 
provide for federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions. 
The present system has evolved from the statute enacted by Congress 




with second - or even third and fourth - petitions for relief. 
current rules governing abuse of _the writ and successive petitions 
have not served to prevent this repetitive and usually meritless, 
litigation. This committee believes that any serious reform 
proposal must address the problems of delay and repetitive 
litigation. 
B. The Need for Counsel 
A ' second serious problem with the current system is the 
pressing need for qualified counsel to represent inmates 
• rl.. 
in 
collateral review. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in 
Murray v. Giarrantano, provision of counsel for criminal defendants 
is constitutionally required only for trial and direct appellate 
review. Because the focus of review in capital cases often shifts 
to collateral review, the lack of adequate counsel creates severe 
problems. 
7. 
Capital inmates almost uniformly are indigent, and often 
illiterate or uneducated. Capital habeas litigation may be 
difficult and complex. Prisoners acting pro se rarely present 
promptly or properly exhaust their constitutional challenges in the 
state forum. This results in delayed or ineffective federal 
collateral procedures. The end result is often appointment of 
qualified counsel only when an execution is imminent. But at this 
stage, serious constitutional claims may have been waived. The 
belated entry of a lawyer, under severe time pressure, does little 
to ensure fairness. In sum, the committee believes that provision 
of competent counsel for prisoners under capi ta l sentence 
throughout both state and federal collateral review is crucial to 
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8. 
C. Last Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is that 
litigation of constitutional claims often comes only when prompted 
by the setting of an execution date. Judicial resources are 
expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of execution in order to 
present his claims. Justice may be ill-served by conducting 
judicial proceedings in capital cases under the pressure of an 
impending execution. In some cases last minute habeas corpus 
petitions have resulted from the unavailability of counsel at any 
earlier time. But in some cases attorneys appear to have 
intentionally delayed filing until time pressures were severe. In 
most cases, successive petitions are meritless, and we believe many 
are filed at the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a rational 
system of justice. In the committee's view, competent counsel 
should be required. Of course, the merits of capital cases should . 
be reviewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time 




pressure. This should be true both during state and federal 
collateral review. But once this review has occurred, absent 
extraordinary circumstances there should be no further last minute 
litigation. 
III. The Committee Proposal 
In response to the problems described above, the 
committee proposes new statutory procedures for federal habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences where competent counsel has been 
provided. Separate procedures for capital cases are appropriate in 
light of the problems of capital litigation. The incentives facing 
the capital litigant are unique. Prisoners serving an ordinary term 
of years have every incentive to bring their claims to resolution 
as soon as possible in order to gain relief. Also they are serving 
their sentences. In contrast, the inmate under capital sentence, 
whose guilt frequently is never in question, has every incentive 
to delay the proceedings that must take place before that sentence 
is carried out. Such an inmate is avoiding the punishment 
prescribed by the law of the state. 
10. 
The committee's proposal is aimed at achieving this goal: 
Capital cases should be subject to one complete and fair course of 
collateral review in the state and federal system, free from the 
time pressure of impending execution, and with the assistance of 
competent counsel for the defendant. When this review has 
concluded, litigation should end. 
The specific operation of our proposed legislation3 is 
described in notes following each statutory section. Some general 
comments are appropriate here. The proposal allows a state to bring 
capital litigation by its prisoners within the new statute that 
provides competent counsel for inmates on state collateral review. 
Participation in the proposal is thus optional with the states. 
Because it is optional, the proposal should cause minimal intrusion 
on state prerogatives. But for states that are concerned with delay 
3our proposal would add a new Subchapter B dealing with 
Capital Cases. Sections 2241-2255 of Subchapter A will not be 
changed. We refer to these changes simply as a proposed "statute" 
or as a "proposal". 
11. 
in capital litigation, it is hoped that the procedural mechanisms 
we recommend will provide an incentive to provide the counsel that 
are needed for fairness. 
The statute provides for a 180 day limitations period 
within which the federal habeas petition must be filed. THe 
limitations period begins to run only on the appointment of counsel 
for the prisoner, or a refusal of the offer of counsel. The 
limitations ' period also is tolled during the pendency of all state 
court proceedings. In view of the provision for counsel, the 
tolling provisions, and the fact that the exhaustion requirement 
mandates that the prisoner's federal petition present the same 
claims contained in the state petition, the six-month period 
provides adequate time for the development and presentation of 
claims. Importantly, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
execution which is to remain in place until federal habeas 
proceedings are completed, or until the prisoner has failed to file 
a petition within the allotted time. 
12. 
Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will 
encompass only claims that have been exhausted in state court. With 
the counsel provided by the statute, there should be no excuse for 
failure to raise claims in state court. The statute allows for 
exceptions in extraordinary cases on the basis of new law or newly 
discovered facts. In the event the entire counseled state and 
federal collateral process concludes without relief being granted, 
the statute includes new mechanisms to promote finality. Subsequent 
and successive federal habeas petitions can no longer be the basis 
of a stay of execution absent a colorable showing of factual 
innocence. Relief will still be available in extraordinary cases 
on the basis of new law or newly discovered facts. 
IV. Conclusion 
The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system 
is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness requires that 
a defendant be provided a searching and impartial examination of 
his claims. Fairness also requires that, if a defendant's claims, 
13. 
after such examination, are found to be devoid of merit, society 
is rightfully entitled to have the penalty prescribed by law 
carried out without unreasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to competent 
counsel at state trial and in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
The Committee's proposal will fill a gap which now exists by 
providing competent counsel also in state habeas or collateral 
proceedings. The proposal also assures that, upon completion of 
state proceedings, a defendant will have one opportunity to have 
his claims reviewed carefully by the federal courts. Thereafter, 
if no infirmity in the conviction has been found, judicial 
proceedings will be at an end, absent exceptional new developments. 
The Committee believes that its proposal will go far to 
rectify the current chaos in capital litigation--periodic 
inactivity and last minute frenzied activity, scheduling and 
rescheduling of execution dates--which diminishes public confidence 
in the criminal justice system. 
14. 
In sum, adoption of this proposal will significantly 
improve fairness in death penalty litigation. 
.,. 
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AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
Proposed Committee Report 
I. Introduction 
Studies of public opinion establish that an over-
whelming majority of our citizens favors the death penalty 
for certain murders. The Supreme Court has made clear that 
the evolving standards of decency embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment permit imposition of this punishment for some of-
fenders. Of course, both the Court and society have recog-
nized that, because it is irreversible, death is a unique 
punishment. This realization demands safeguards to ensure 
that capital punishment is administered with the utmost re-
liability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-layered state and 
federal appeal and collateral review has led to repetitious 
litigation and years of delay between sentencing and execu-
tion. The resulting lack of finality undermines public con-
fidence in our criminal justice system. The delay inherent 
in the present system brings little benefit in terms of re-
liability in sentencing or fair and orderly review of con-
stitutional claims. Adding to the problem is the fact that 
• 
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prisoners often cannot obtain qualified counsel until execu-
tion is imminent. The resulting last-minute rushed litiga-
tion disserves inmates, and saps the resources of our judi-
ciary. 
To address these problems, Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist formed this Committee in June 1988. His charge to 
us was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of 
legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of 
finality" in capital cases in which the prisoner had or had 
been offered counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as mem-
bers of this Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, Chief Judge Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, District 
Judge Hodges of Florida and Judge Sanders of Texas. The 
states in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have by far the 
greatest numbers of prisoners subject to capital sentences, 
and each of these judges has had extensive experience with 
federal review of capital cases. The chairman of the Com-
mittee, retired Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
served as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit while 
sitting on the Supreme Court. Professor Albert M. Pearson 
of the University of Georgia, who has experience in capital 
cases, was the Reporter for the Committee. William R. 
Burchill, Jr., General Counsel of the Administrative Office 
served as Secretary. 
The Committee met six times and considered with 
care the problems associated with collateral review of capi-
3. 
tal sentences. We invited written comments from a broad 
spectrum of interested parties and organizations, and re-
ceived a number of helpful presentations. These included 
the views of state and federal prosecutors, groups urging 
abolition of the death penalty, state executives and legis-
lators, and criminal defense and public defender organiza-
tions. The responses contributed to our findings, which 
follow, and to the formulation of the legislation we pro-
pose. 
II. Findings 
A. Delay and Repetition 
The Committee identified serious problems with the 
present system of collateral review. The most general of 
these is that the dual system of state and federal collater-
al review engenders chaotic litigation and excessive delay. 
Few would argue that the current state of death penalty ad-
ministration is satisfactory. There are now approximately 
2,200 convicted murderers on death row awaiting execution. 
Yet since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision only 116 
executions have taken place. The shortest of these judicial 
proceedings required two years and nine months to complete. 
The longest covered a period of 14 years and six months. 
The length of the average proceeding was eight years and two 
months. 
The Committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of 
the time spent in collateral litigation in death penalty 
cases occurs outside of state collateral proceedings. A 
table showing the average time periods and ratios in death 
penalty cases in these states is attached to this report. 
4. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well 
as the delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes 
clear that the present system of collateral review operates 
to frustrate the law of 37 states. 1 The collateral review 
process tends to be erratic and frequently is repetitious. 
The long separation of sentence and execution hampers jus-
tice without improving the quality of adjudication. 2 Be-
cause res judicata is inapplicable to federal habeas pro-
ceedings, many capital litigants return to federal court 
with second - or even third and fourth - petitions for re-
lief. Current rules governing abuse of the writ and succes-
sive petitions have not served to prevent these endless 
filings. This Committee believes that any serious reform 
proposal must address the problems of delay and repetitive 
litigation. 
1 Federal law also provides for capital punishment in 
certain cases. See P.L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4387 (Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988) (murders committed in connection 
w~th narcotics offenses.) 
Contrary to what may be assumed, the Constitution 
does not provide for federal habeas corpus review of state 
court decisions. The writ of habeas corpus available to 
state prisoners is not that mentioned in the Constitution. 
It has evolved from a statute enacted by Congress in 1867, 
now codified 28 U.S.C. §2254. 
5. 
B. The Need for Counsel 
A second serious problem with the current system is 
the pressing need for qualified counsel to represent inmates 
in collateral review. As the Supreme Court recently reaf-
firmed in Murray v. Giarrantano, provision of counsel for 
criminal defendants is constitutionally required only for 
trial and direct appellate review. Because, as a practical 
matter, the focus of review in capital cases often shifts to 
collateral proceedings, the lack of adequate counsel creates 
severe problems. This remains true despite the fact that 
Congress has recently provided for appointment of counsel in 
federal habeas proceedings in capital cases as part of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
Capital inmates almost uniformly are indigent, and 
often illiterate or uneducated. Capital habeas litigation 
may be difficult and complex. Prisoners acting prose rare-
ly present promptly or properly exhaust their constitutional 
challenges in the state forum. This results in delayed or 
ineffective federal collateral procedures. The end result 
is often appointment of qualified counsel only when an exe-
cution is imminent. But at this stage, serious constitu-
tional claims may have been waived. The belated entry of a 
lawyer, under severe time pressure, does little to ensure 
fairness. In sum, the Committee believes that provision of 
competent counsel for prisoners under capital sentence 
throughout both state and federal collateral review is cru-
6 • 
cial to ensuring fairness and protecting the constitutional 
rights of capital litigants. 
C. Last Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is 
that litigation of constitutional claims often comes only 
when prompted by the setting of an execution date. Judicial 
resources are expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of 
execution in order to present his claims. Justice may be 
ill-served by conducting judicial proceedings in capital 
cases under the pressure of an impending execution. In some 
cases last minute habeas corpus petitions have resulted from 
the unavailability of counsel at any earlier time. But in 
other cases at~orneys appear to have intentionally delayed 
filing until time pressures were severe. In most cases, 
successive petitions are meritless, and we believe many are 
filed at the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a 
rational system of justice. The merits of capital cases 
should be reviewed carefully and deliberately, and not under 
time pressure. This should be true both during state and 
federal collateral review. But once this review has oc-
curred, absent extraordinary circumstances there should be 
no further last minute litigation. 
III. The Committee Proposal 
In response to the problems described above, the 
Committee proposes new statutory procedures for federal ha-
7 • 
beas corpus review of capital sentences where counsel has 
been provided. Separate procedures for capital cases are 
appropriate in light of the special problems of capital lit-
igation. The incentives facing the capital litigant are 
unique. Prisoners serving an ordinary term of years have 
every incentive to bring their claims to resolution as soon 
as possible in order to gain relief. And they are serving 
their sentences while litigation takes place. In contrast, 
the inmate under capital sentence, whose guilt frequently is 
never in question, has every incentive to delay the proceed-
ings that must take place before that sentence is carried 
out. Such an inmate is avoiding the punishment prescribed 
by the law of the state. 
The Committee's proposal is aimed at achieving this 
goal: Capital cases should be subject to one complete and 
fair course of collateral review in the state and federal 
system, free from the time pressure of impending execution, 
and with the assistance of competent counsel for the defend-
ant. When this review has concluded, litigation should end. 
The specific operation of our proposed legislation 3 
is described in notes following each statutory section. 
Some general comments are appropriate here. The proposal 
3 Our proposal would add a new Subchapter B dealing 
with Capital Cases. Sections 2241-2255 of Subchapter A 
will not be changed. We refer to these changes simply as 
a proposed "statute" or as a "proposal". 
8 • 
allows a state to bring capital litigation by its prisoners 
within the new statute by providing competent counsel for 
inmates on state collateral review. Participation in the 
proposal is thus optional with the states. Because it is 
optional, the proposal should cause minimal intrusion on 
state prerogatives. But for states that are concerned with 
delay in capital litigation, it is hoped that the procedural 
mechanisms we recommend will provide an incentive to provide 
the counsel that are needed for fairness. 
The statute provides for a six-month limitations 
period within which the federal habeas petition must be 
filed. The limitations period begins to run only on the 
appointment of counsel for the prisoner, or a refusal of the 
offer of counsel. The limitations period also is tolled 
during the pendency of all state court proceedings. In view 
of the provision for counsel, the tolling provisions, and 
the fact that the exhaustion requirement mandates that the 
prisoner's federal petition present the same claims con-
tained in the state petition, the six-month period ensures 
adequate time for the development and presentation of 
claims. A further extension of time is available for cases 
where good cause is shown. Although the time period may 
seem short in view of the fact that no time limit whatsoever 
exists at present, it should be noted in comparison that six 
months is far longer than the time provided for appeals in 
6Y---
zi,'510) 
the state and federal systems, or for seeking certiorari 
review in the Supreme Court. 
9. 
Importantly, the statute provides for an automatic 
stay of execution which is to remain in place until federal 
habeas proceedings are completed, or until the prisoner has 
failed to file a petition within the allotted time. This 
automatic stay ensures that claims need not be evaluated 
under the time pressure of a scheduled execution. It should 
substantially eliminate the rushed litigation over stay mo-
tions that is troubling for both litigants and the judicia-
ry. 
Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will 
encompass only claims that have been exhausted in state 
court. With the counsel provided by the statute, there 
should be no excuse for failure to raise claims in state 
court. The statute allows for exceptions in extraordinary 
cases on the basis of new law or newly discovered facts. In 
the event the entire counseled state and federal collateral 
process concludes without relief being granted, the statute 
includes new mechanisms to promote finality. Subsequent 
federal habeas petitions can no longer be the 
L.NV ()1)/Y ~ i s of a stay or execution absent a colorable showing of 
~µ. 
/~.,J~ 0 actual innocence. 
~~ v-
Relief will still be available in ex-
inary cases on the basis of new law or newly discov 
e_,,tyN ~ ered facts. L 






The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice 
system is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness 
requires that a defendant be provided a searching and impar-
tial examination of his claims. Fairness also requires that 
if a defendant's claims are found to be devoid of merit 
after such examination, society is rightfully entitled to 
have the penalty prescribed by law carried out without un-
reasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to compe-
tent counsel at state trial and in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. The Committee's proposal will fill a gap which 
now exists by providing competent counsel also in state ha-
beas or collateral proceedings. The proposal further as-
sures that, upon completion of state proceedings, a defend-
ant will have one opportunity to have his claims reviewed 
carefully by the federal courts. Thereafter, if no infirmi-
ty in the conviction has been found, judicial proceedings 
will be at an end, absent exceptional new developments. 
The Committee believes that its proposal will go 
far to rectify the current chaos in capital litigation -
periodic inactivity and last minute frenzied activity, 
scheduling and rescheduling of execution dates - which di-
minishes public confidence in the criminal justice system. 
In sum, adoption of this proposal will significantly improve 
fairness in death penalty litigation. 
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CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
~~-
Subchapter A. General Provisions [a proposed redesignation] / 
g z.z/Y9 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
Subchapter B. Capital Cases: Special Procedures [new] 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to capital 
sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of 
rule of court or statute; procedures for 
appointment 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under 
section 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody who are 
subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied. 
(b) This subchapter is applicable if a state establishes by 
rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 
the appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses of competent counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose 
capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct 
appeal to the court of last resort in the state or have otherwise 
become final for state law purposes. The rule of court or 
l 
statute must provide standards of competency for the appointment 
of such counsel. 
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation and 
reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) must offer 
counsel to all state prisoners under capital sentence and must 
provide for the entry of an order by a court of record: (1) 
appointing one or more counsel to represent the prisoner upon a 
finding that the prisoner is indigent and accepted the offer or 
is ' unable competently to decide whether to accept or reject the 
offer; (2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the 
prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made the decision with 
an understanding of its legal consequences; or (3) denying the 
appointment of counsel upon a finding that the prisoner is not 
indigent. 
(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) 
to represent a state prisoner under capital sentence shall have 
previously represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal 
in the case for which the appointment is made unless the prisoner 
2 
a nd counsel expressly request continued representation. 
(e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
state or federal collateral post-conviction proceedings in a 
capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding 
arising under section 2254 or this subchapter. This limitation 
shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel at any 
phase of state or federal post-conviction proceedings. 
~i COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of what would be 
new subchapter B which establishes rules and procedures that 
apply solely to section 2254 cases involving prisoners under 
capital sentence. The aim of this subchapter is to provide a 
mechanism for the post-conviction litigation of capital cases 
_,.,. 
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""f'i.(_~ I • that '<l'ias enhanced procedural safeguards for the prisoner and yet 
is less time consuming and less cumbersome from the v-a-n~agel\Point u··u .. ..t.J 
of the jurisdiction seeking to enforce its death penalty. There ~r 
is no intent to alter the substantive scope of federal habeas 
corpus review under section 2254. 
Subchapter B offers an alternative to the present process of 
post-conviction review in capital cases. If it is applicable, it 
would in all but the most unusual of capital cases limit each 
prisoner to a single opportunity for federal habeas corpus review 
under section 2254. This limitation would advance the state 
interest in the finality of criminal convictions and capital 
sentences. But to avail itself of subchapter B's more structured 
habeas corpus review procedures, a state would have to establish 
a system for the appointment and compensation of competent 
counsel throughout all stages of state post conviction review. 
The purpose of this mechanism is to assure that if a state 
prisoner under capital sentence has only a single opportunity for 
revie_li_____under section 2254, that review will be fair, thorough and 
- ~ he product of capable and committed advocacy. While subchapter 
~ B attempts to)_e-r--a.~t a realistic balance between the values of 
judicial efficiency and procedural fairness in the context of a 
--- --- federal system, it does not impose a solution on the states. 
Each state must assess the utility of subchapter B for itself. 
3 
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Unless a state takes the affirmative steps required in sections 
2256(b) and (c), its litigation of capital cases under section 
2254 will be governed by the statutory and court rules that 
presently apply to all federal habeas corpus cases. 
Under subsection (a), the special rules and procedures of 
sections 2257-2260 apply if a state establishes a mechanism for 
the appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses of competent counsel to represent indigent 
prisoners under capital sentence in state post-conviction 
proceedings. Central to efficacy of this scheme is the 
development of standards governing the competency of counsel 
chosen to serve in this specialized and demanding area of 
litigation. This mechanism is to be established by state statute 
or by rule of the state court of last resort. The Committee 
believes that it is more consistent with the federal-state 
balance to give the states ls idellatitude to establish a mechanism 
that complies with subsecti'on (b ). 
The final judgment as to the adequacy of any system for the 
appointment of counsel under subsection (b), however, rests 
ultimately with the federal judiciary. If prisoners under 
capital sentence in a particular state doubt that a state's 
mechanism for appointing counsel complies with subsection (b), 
the adequacy of the system -- as opposed to the competency of 
particular counsel -- can be raised in a section 2265 proceeding 
or perhaps might be challenged in a class action brought under 
section 1983. One way or the other a state and its prisoners 
under capital sentence will get a definitive ruling on the 
applicability of subchapter B. 
If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, the 
state mechanism must offer counsel to all state prisoners under 
capital sentence. In addition, it must provide for the entry of 
an appropriate judicial order based on the state prisoner's 
response to the offer of counsel. Judicial control of this 
process is necessary to establish a clear point in time to 
determine the applicability of sections 2257 and 2258. It is 
also necessary to assure that a full record exists showing which 
state prisoners have appointed counsel and which do not. 
Under subsection (c), all indigent state prisoners under 
capital sentence would be entitled to counsel in state post 
conviction proceedings as a matter of right. If an indigent 
prisoner is not competent to decide whether to accept or decline 
the state's offer, the state must appoint counsel in any event. 
If a prisoner is not indigent, which would be the rare case, he 
would not be entitled to the appointment of counsel even if he 
accepted the state's offer. Finally, in some instances, a 
prisoner might reject the offer of counsel. This rejection would 
become effective and binding only after a judicial inquiry into 
the prisoner's understanding of the legal consequences of his 
4 
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Subsection (d) establishes a rule requiring the appointment 
of new counsel at the state post-conviction phase of capital 
litigation. The primary reason for the rule is that during the 
post-conviction review, ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel is frequently a major issue. It would be 
unrealistic to expect a capital defendant's trial or appellate 
counsel to raise a vigorous challenge to his own effectiveness. 
A secondary reason is that trial and appellate counsel in death 
penalty cases serve under great pressure and often work 
themselves to the point of emotional and physical exhaustion. 
They are understandably less able to undertake a fresh and 
dispassionate consideration of the issues raised or possibly 
overlooked at trial and on direct appeal. The appointment of new 
counsel at the state habeas phase will do as much as can be done 
to overcome these difficulties. The Committee, however, did not 
believe the rule should be absolute. In some cases, the prisoner 
under capital sentence may have such trust and confidence in his 
trial or appellate counsel that he would desire the attorney-
client relationship to continue during state post-conviction 
review. Subsection (d) would permit, though not require, 
continued representation if the prisoner and his counsel 
expressly make a request to the appointing authority established 
by the state. 
Subsection (e) provides that the ineffectiveness or 
incompetence of counsel during state or federal post-conviction 
review in a capital case is not a ground for relief in section 
2254 proceedings. This rule reflects settled constitutional 
doctrine which limits ineffective assistance of counsel 
challenges to those criminal proceedings to which the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches. Murray v. Giarrantano, 
U.S. __ (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 US 551 (1987). 
The Committee recognizes that the competence of counsel 
during all stages of state and federal post-conviction review is 
of the utmost importance in capital cases. However, as far as 
federal review in a proceeding under section 2254 is concerned, 
it believes that the focus constitutionally should be on the 
performance of a capital defendant's trial and appellate counsel. 
The effectiveness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is 
a matter that can and must be dealt with in the appointment 
process. Only one who has the clear ability and willingness to 
handle a capital case should be appointed under subsections (b) 
and (c). If at any time during state or federal post-conviction 
review it appears that appointed counsel is unable to discharge 
his obligations in a timely and competent manner, the remedy is 
for the court to appoint a replacement and to permit post-
conviction review to go forward without prejudice to the 
prisoner. 
5 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate state court of record 
~ 
( 
of an order pursuant to section 2256(c), a warrant or order 
setting an execution date for a state prisoner shall be stayed 
upon application to any court that would have jurisdiction over 
any proceeding filed pursuant to Section 2254. The application 
must recite that the state has invoked the post-conviction review 
procedures of this subchapter and that the scheduled execution is 
subject to stay. 
(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall expire if: 
(1) A state prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus 
petition under Section 2254 within the time required in Section 
2258; or 
(2) Upon completion of district court and court of 
appeals review under Section 2254 the petition for relief is 
denied and (A) the time for filing a petition for certiorari has 
6 
expired and no petition has been filed; (B) a timely petition for 
certiorari was filed and the Supreme Court denied the petition; 
or (C) a timely petition for certiorari was filed and upon 
consideration of the case, the Supreme Court disposed of it in a 
manner that left the capital sentence undisturbed; or 
(3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
presence of counsel and after having been fully advised of the 
consequences of his decision, a state prisoner under capital 
sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review under 
Section 2254. 
(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, 
no federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a 
stay of execution or grant relief in a capital case unless: 
(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is a 
claim not previously presented in the state or federal courts; 
(2) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 




a new federal right that is retroactively applicable or (C) based 
on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present 
the claim for state or federal post-conviction review; and 
(3) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient, 
if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's 
determination of guilt on the offense or offenses for which the 
death penalty was imposed. 
/ ~ 
COMMENT: This subchapter rests on the assumption that every 
state prisoner under capital sentence should have one opportunity 
for full state and federal post-conviction review before being 
subject to execution. Although this appears to have been the 
practice in capital cases since Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 
(1972), it has never been formally recognized as such. Many 
state prisoners under capital sentence have struggled to secure a 
stay of execution -- often against the vigorous opposition of the 
state -- before availing themselves of even one chance to pursue 
state and federal post-conviction review. Stay of execution 
litigatiofl)._has been subject to ~inar i:ry tight deadlines, 
places unrealistic demands on ju~ges, lawyers and the prisoner > 




of right._...J!lhe--.pr.~ a- waste _of-t. ime and- effo~ 
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If applicable, section 2257 would eliminate stay of c,_/,Ji,..;~ V 
execution litigation during a state prisoner's first request for 
post-conviction relief. It provides for a mandatory stay of 
execution in capital cases at any time following the appointment 
of counsel pursuant to section 2256(c). If an execution date ,L 1 
has been set, the prisoner can~ a stay as a matter of right O"'Cl""'f~ 
simply by making application to any federal court that would have 
jurisdiction over the case in a proceeding brought under section 
2254. In practice, however, even this step is not likely to be 
necessary. If a state takes the steps required in section 2256 
to bring its capital litigation under this subchapter, there will 
be no reason to set an execution date until the completion of 
8 
state and federal post-conviction review. At that juncture, the 
federal courts would have no authority to stay executions except 
under the very limited circumstances identified in section 
2257(c). 
Subsection (b) establishes the duration of a stay of 
execution issued under this subchapter. In effect, it provides 
that a stay of execution issued under subsection (a) will remain 
in effect as long as state and federal post-conviction review in 
a capital case is being actively pursued by the state prisoner. 
The relationship between subsection (b)(l) and section 2258 
is particularly important. Under subsection (b)(l), a stay of 
execution remains in force as long as the state prisoner files a 
section 2254 petition in federal court within the 180 day period 
set forth in section 2258. It is important to emphasize here 
that the object of the 180 day period established in section 2258 
-- which includes the right to apply for a 60 day extension -- is 
not to produce default. Rather it is one of a series of 
provisions in this subchapter designed to stimulate the orderly 
and expeditious consideration on the merits of all federal issues 
arising in capital cases. 
If a state prisoner files a petition under section 2254 
within the time period set forth in section 2258, subsection 
(b)(2) extends the right to a stay of execution to include the 
entire period that the case is pending before the district court, 
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court if a petition for 
certiorari is filed. The right to a stay would expire after the 
opportunity for Supreme Court review has passed or after the 
Supreme Court has considered a petition for certiorari and has 
denied the petition or disposed of the case without overturning 
the capital sentence. The Committee assumes that in capital 
cases the state prisoner will want to pursue every opportunity 
for federal post-conviction review open to him including Supreme 
Court review. But once this review process comes to its 
conclusion without a reversa l of the capital sentence, it is the 
Committee's belief that federal review should ~~r. 
In subsection (b)(3), the authority of a federa'l- court to 
stay the execution of a state prisoner expires if there is a 
waiver of the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
2254. To eliminate doubt about the validity of the 
waiver, subsection (b)(3) requires that the prisoner announce 
the decision before a court of competent jurisdiction and in the 
presence of his counsel. It also requires the court -- which can 
be state or federal -- to advise the prisoner of the 
consequences of the waiver decision. 
After the occurrence of one of the conditions resulting in 
the expiration of the right to a mandatory stay of execution 
under subsection (b)(2), federal review in capital cases pursuant 
9 
to section 2254 is extremely limited. Subsection (c) would 
thereafter permit a stay of execution and the grant of relief in 
a capital case only if: (1) the claim has never been raised in 
state or federal court previously; (2) there is a valid excuse 
for not discovering and raising the claim during the prisoner's 
initial opportunity for state and federal post-conviction review; 
and (3) the facts underlying the claim raise a serious doubt 
about the prisoner's guilt on the offense or offenses for which 
the death penalty was imposed. 
The third of these conditions is clearly the most important. 
In the Committee's view, if there is any doubt about the 
sentencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
state prisoner's initial attempt to obtain post-conviction 
review. Often factual guilt is not seriously in dispute. Both 
the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive to ask whether 
all relevant information in mitigation of punishment was 
presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial was 
otherwise conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. Given the 
clear incentive to do this, the Committee does not believe that 
the federal courts should have to consider a second petition 
under section 2254 which challenges only the sentencing phase 
in a capital case. As subsection (c) reflects, the only 
appropriate exception is when the new claim goes to the 
underlying guilt or innocence of the state prisoner under capital 
sentence. Murray v. Carrier, 477 US 478 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 
477 us 527 (1986). 
Section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time require-
ments; tolling rules 
Any petition for habeas corpus relief under Section 2254 
must be filed in the appropriate district court within 180 days 
from the filing in the appropriate state court of record of an 
order issued in compliance with Section 2256(c). The time 
requirements established by this section shall be tolled: 
10 
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(a) From the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in 
the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the 
petition if a state prisoner seeks review of a capital sentence 
that has been affirmed on direct appeal by the court of last 
resort of the state or has otherwise become final for state law 
purposes. 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-conviction 
review pending before a state court of competent jurisdiction; if 
all state filing rules are met in a timely manner, this period 
shall run continuously from the date that the state prisoner 
initially files for post-conviction review until final 
disposition of the case by the highest court of the state; 
provided, however, the tolling rule established by this sub-
section does not apply during the pendency of a petition for 
certiorari before the Supreme Court following such state post-
conviction review. 
(c) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
11 
counsel for the state prisoner: (1) moves for an extension of 
time in the federal district court that would have proper 
jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under Section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good cause 
for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition within 
the 180 day period established by this section. 
COMMENT: Section 2258 requires a state prisoner under 
capital sentence to file a section 2254 petition within 180 days 
from the entry of an order under section 2256(c). In almost all 
cases, this will be an order appointing counsel to initiate state 
post-conviction review. But even if a state prisoner is not 
entitled to t9e appointment of counsel or simply rejects the 
state's offe~of appointment, the 180 day period applies to all 
capital cases if the state is subject to this subchapter. 
Although the 180 day filing rule resembles a statute of 
limitation, it does not function like a statute of limitation nor 
is it intended to do so. 
In death penalty jurisdictions, the sole incentive for a 
prisoner to initiate post-conviction review is either the 
scheduling of an execution date or the threat to schedule one. 
The disadvantages of this method of administering capital 
litigation persuaded the Committee to recommend the mandatory 
stay of execution provisions in section 2257. But it is clear 
that there must be some substitute mechanism to cause 
understandably reluctant state prisoners to seek post-conviction 
review when such action may remove the only obstacle preventing 
the state from carrying out the death sentence. 
The entry of an order under section 2256(c) is such a 
substitute. It starts the state post-conviction litigation clock 
in capital litigation. Unless the state prisoner actively 
litigates his case after his conviction and capital sentence have 
become final on direct appeal, he risks losing the right to file 
a section 2254 petition in federal court. Thus, the 180 day 
filing requirement serves the state interest in promoting 
finality in capital cases. At the same time, this subchapter 
serves to advance that interest only if the state provides 
state prisoners under capital sentence with the means --
12 
c ompetent counsel at state expense -- to assert their legal 
rights in state post-conviction proceedings. As stressed 
earlier, the interaction of sections 2256, 2257 and 2258 is 
designed not to produce finality through procedural default but 
rather through a structured process of post-conviction litigation 
that brings all potentially meritorious claims to the attention 
of the state and federal courts before the imposition of the 
death penalty becomes legally permissible. 
There are several important tolling rules in section 2258. 
With one exception the litigation clock does not run after the 
filing of a section 2256(c) order as long as a capital case is 
pending for consideration before a court of competent 
jurisdiction. The policy underlying section 2258 is to encourage 
litigants to initiate the post-conviction review process and to 
keep it moving from stage to stage. If delay in the litigation 
process is due to slow judicial consideration of death penalty 
litigation, that time obviously should not be and is not counted 
in computing the 180 day period under section 2258. 
Under section 2258(a), the 180 day period is tolled when a 
state prisoner files a petition for certiorari in the Supreme 
Court after affirmance of his capital sentence on direct appeal 
to the state court of last resort. It is extremely important to 
recognize, as section 2258(b) makes clear, that there is no 
comparable tolling rule to permit the filing of certiorari 
petitions after state post-conviction review. The Committee 
believes that multiple opportunities for Supreme Court review are 
not essential to fairness in the consideration of capital cases. 
In this vein, it would point out that the Supreme Court since 
1972 has granted certiorari in only 2 of 99 capital cases after 
state post-conviction review. This does not result in 
disadvantage to the state prisoner, however, since all issues 
raised in state post-conviction review can be carried forward in 
a section 2254 petition and ultimately presented to the Supreme 
Court. The Committee believes that once post-conviction 
proceedings have begun, it would be a better use of the Supreme 
Court's limited resources to defer certiorari review in capital 
cases until after all lower court consideration -- state and 
federal -- has been completed. 
The litigation clock also stops under section 2258(b) during 
any period that a capital case is pending for post-conviction 
review before a state court of competent jurisdiction. After all 
state post-conviction review has been completed, including review 
by the court of last resort, the 180 day time clock begins to run 
again if the capital sentence is undisturbed. The next step for 
the state prisoner is to file a section 2254 petition in federal 
district court. If counsel for the state prisoner properly 
discharges his responsibilities, default under the 180 day rule 
will not occur. 
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In the event that counsel experiences some difficulty in 
filing a section 2254 petition on time, subsection (c) authorizes 
a 60 day extension upon a showing of good cause in the federal 
district that would have jurisdiction over the section 2254 
petition when ultimately filed. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal review; 
district court adjudication 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence files 
a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this subchapter 
applies, the district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary record 
for habeas corpus review based on the claims actually presented 
and litigated in the state courts except when the prisoner can 
show that the failure to raise or develop a claim in the state 
courts is (A) the result of state action in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States; (B) the result of the 
Supreme Court recognition of a new federal right that is 
retroactively applicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate 
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
14 
(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing necessary 
to complete the record for habeas corpus review. 
(b) Upon the development of a complete evidentiary record, 
the district court shall rule on the merits of the claims 
properly before it. 
COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of federal review 
in capital cases to which this subchapter applies. It authorizes 
the district court to consider only those federal claims actually 
raised and litigated in the state courts. If the section 2254 
petition presents no new claims, the district court will proceed 
to rule on the merits of the claims properly before it as long as 
the state evidentiary record and findings of fact are adequate. 
If they are deficient in any respect recognized under section 
2254(d), the district court must complete the evidentiary record 
before addressing the issues on the merits. To this extent, 
subsection (a) does not depart from existing law and practice. 
If a petitioner asserts a claim not previously presented to 
the state courts, the district court can consider the claim only 
if one of the three exceptions to the general rule listed in 
subsection (a)(l) is applicable. In that case, the district 
court must conduct an evidentiary hearing necessary to a full 
and fair consideration of the claim and in accordance with 
subsection (b) adjudicate it on the merits along with all other 
issues presented in the section 2254 petition. 
As far as new or "unexhausted" claims are concerned, section 
2259 represents a change in the exhaustion doctrine as 
articulated in Rose v. Lundy, 455 US 509 (1982). Section 2259 
bars such claims from consideration unless one of the subsection 
(a)(l) exceptions is applicable. The prisoner cannot return to 
state court to exhaust even if he would like to do so. On the 
other hand, if a subsection (a)(l) exception is applicable, the 
district court is directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and 
to rule on the new claim without first exhausting state remedies 
as Rose v. Lundy now requires. Because of the existence of state 
procedural default rules, exhaustion is futile in the great 
majority of cases. It serves the state interest of comity in 
theory but in practice it results in delay and undermines the 
state interest in the finality of its criminal convictions. The 
Committee believes that the states would prefer to see post-
15 
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c onviction litigation go forward in capital cases even if that 
entails a minor subordination of their interest in comity as it 
is expressed in the exhaustion doctrine. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter except when a second or successive petition is 
filed. 
\ 
COMMENT: The premise of this subchapter is that a state 
prisoner under capital sentence is entitled to one opportunity 
for state and federal post-conviction review before being subject 
to execution. Consistent with this premise, the Committee 
believes that in a section 2254 proceeding, a state prisoner 
should be allowed to appeal from the district court to the court 
of appeals as a matter of right. With one exception, section 
2260 eliminates the certificate of probable cause requirement in 
cases to which this subchapter is applicable. The exception 
arises when a second or successive petition is filed. Even if 
such a petition is authorized under the provisions of section 
2257(c), the right to appeal in that instance will be governed by 
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CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions [a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.) 
Subchapter B. Review of Capital Sentencing: Special Procedures 
[new] 
Section 2256. Review of capital sentencing when prisoner in 
state custody; appointment of counsel; require-
ment of rule of court or statute; procedures for 
appointment 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under 
section 2254 of Title 28 involving prisoners in state custody who 
are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) concerning the appointment 
of counsel are satisfied. No statute or rule of court in 
conflict with this subchapter shall be enforced in a proceeding 
to which this subchapter is applicable. 
(b) To assert the expedited post-conviction review 
procedures in sections 2258 and 2259 of this subchapter, a state 
must establish by rule of its highest court or by statute a 
mechanism for the appointment of counsel to serve continuously, 
if feasible, through state and federal post-conviction 
proceedings in cases involving state prisoners under capital 
sentence. The rule of court or statute must satisfy the 
following additional conditions: 
(1) Extend eligibility for representation to indigent 




direct appeal in the highest court of the state and whose 
convictions have otherwise become final for state law purposes; 
(2) Establish criteria based on integrity, experience 
and demonstrated professional competence to guide the recruitment 
and selection of counsel for appointment; 
(3) Establish and fund a scheme to compensate counsel 
for their services and to reimburse them for the expenses of 
litigation in connection with the state phase of post-conviction 
review; 
(4) Vest the authority to appoint counsel in the Chief 
Justice of the highest court of the state; and 
(5) Authorize the Chief Justice to establish an office 
and to appoint such personnel as deemed necessary: (A) to assist 
in the identification of qualified counsel who would be willing 
to accept appointment to represent prisoners under capital 
sentence in state and federal post-conviction review proceedings 
and (B) to monitor the legal representation provided to the 
prisoners to assure that all filing requirements and deadlines 
are met. 
(c) When the Chief Justice of the highest court of a state 
appoints an attorney as provided in subsection (b), he shall 
enter an order of appointment specifying an effective date 
therein and make the order a part of the public records of the 
court. He shall send a certified copy of the appointment order 
to the person or persons appointed to represent the prisoner 
under capital sentence and advise them of the existence of this 
2 
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subchapter and their responsibilities under it. In addition, he 
shall give notice of the appointment order to the following 
persons or officials: 
(1) the Attorney General of the state; 
(2) the trial judge who presided in the court of 
conviction; 
(3) the clerk of the court in the court of conviction; 
(4) the district attorney who prosecuted in the court 
of conviction; and 
(5) all counsel known to the Chief Justice to have 
represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal. 
COMMENT: This section establishes the scope of the entire 
legislative proposal. The subchapter is triggered by the 
appointment of counsel pursuant to a mechanism described in 
subsections (b) and (c). Regardless of whether a state uses the 
statute or rule of court approach -- the latter may be 
problematic -- the mechanism for appointment of counsel is 
subject to judicial control through the authority of the chief 
justice of the highest court in the state. Centralizing 
authority at this level should enable a state to identify and 
keep track of attorneys willing and able to provide 
representation in death penalty cases better than would be true 
if this authority resided at the trial court level. It also 
should provide better oversight of attorney performance and 
facilitate judicial discipline if attorneys fail to discharge 
their responsibilities in a timely manner. Subsection (c) lays 
out some of the formalities of the appointment procedure mainly 
so that the starting date of the 365 day time period described in 
section 2258 will be clear, on the public record, and known to 
all attorneys and court officials who have had involvement in the 
case or who might be involved in post conviction proceedings. 
One issue not addressed in this or any other section is 
whether there needs to be a procedure by which a state can know 
in advance that its system for the appointment of counsel in 
post-conviction review proceedings is acceptable. A related 
question is whether it is sound to let each state draft its own 
standards for compliance with section 2256? Another issue 
involves a basic assumption underlying the entire subchapter. If 
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the state complies with section 2256 and makes counsel available 
to a state prisoner under capital sentence, the expedited post-
conviction review procedures apply to all death penalty cases in 
the jurisdiction even if some inmates elect to have other 
volunteer counsel or can afford to retain counsel. Is this 
assumption sound? If so, should it be made explicit? 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
(a) Running from the effective date of the order appointing 
counsel pursuant to section 2256, any order or warrant setting an 
execution date for a state prisoner under capital sentence shall 
be subject to automatic stay upon application to any court, state 
or federal, that has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The 
application must recite only that the state has invoked the post-
conviction review procedures established by this subchapter and 
that the scheduled execution is subject to automatic stay. 
(b) The stay of execution authorized by this section shall 
remain in effect throughout all stages of post-conviction review, 
including any time period during which a case is pending for 
consideration or disposition before the United States Supreme 
Court. It shall expire automatically if: 
(1) Counsel for the state prisoner fails to file a 
habeas corpus petition in the proper federal district court 
within 365 days of the effective date of his appointment under 
section 2256. 
(2) Upon completion of state and lower federal court 
post-conviction review, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity 
to consider a petition for certiorari and has either denied the 
4 
.·. 
petition or, upon consideration of any questions on the merits, 
has disposed of the case in a manner that leaves the capital 
sentence undisturbed. 
(c) No federal court thereafter shall have the authority to 
enter a stay of execution in the case unless: 
(1) the basis for the stay is a claim not previously 
presented in the state or lower federal courts; 
(2) the facts underlying the claim are sufficient, if 
proven, to undermine substantially the court's confidence in the 
jury's determination of guilt on the underlying offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed; and 
(3) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable or (C) based 
on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present 
the claim for state or federal post-conviction review. 
COMMENT: This section establishes an automatic stay of 
execution rule that comes into play upon the appointment of 
counsel pursuant to section 2256. Procedurally, obtaining an 
automatic stay would be a simple matter which is unlike current 
practice. Subsection (b) provides the rules for the expiration 
of the automatic stay: (1) if counsel fails to file a federal 
habeas petition within the 365 day period; and (2) after Supreme 
Court review of a case upon the completion of all state and lower 
federal court post-conviction review. With effective oversight 
of counsel, the first basis for the expiration of an automatic 
stay hopefully will never be a problem. Subsection (c) 
eliminates substantially all federal court authority to issue 
stays of execution after one full opportunity for state and 
federal post-conviction review. The exception is narrowly 
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defined and requires that the new claim cast doubt on the 
validity of the underlying conviction -- the factual guilt of the 
accused. As written, the exception does not apply to new 
evidence that arguably might have a bearing on the jury's 
determination to impose the death penalty. 
section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petitions; ti.me require-
ments; tolling rules 
counsel appointed under section 2256 to represent a state 
prisoner under capital sentence shall file the petition for 
habeas corpus in the appropriate federal district court within 
365 days from the effective date of the appointment by the Chief 
Justice of the highest court in the state. The filing rule 
established by this section shall be tolled as follows: 
(1) During the time period running from the date of the 
filing of a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court until 
the date of final disposition of the case, if counsel for the 
state prisoner files a petition for certiorari following the 
affirmance of his capital sentence on direct appeal by the 
highest court of the state; 
(2) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-conviction 
review pending before a state court of competent jurisdiction; if 
all state filing rules are met in a timely manner, this period 
shall run continuously from the date that the state prisoner 
files a request for post-conviction review of his capital 
sentence in the court of conviction or other proper trial court 
until final disposition of the case on appeal by the highest 
court of the state; 
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{3) During a period not to exceed 60 days, if counsel 
for the state prisoner: (A) moves for an extension of time in 
the federal district court that would have proper jurisdiction 
over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus petition and (B) 
makes a showing of good cause for counsel's inability to file the 
habeas corpus petition within the 365 day period established by 
this section. The motion for extension of time may not be filed 
prior to the completion of all state post-conviction review of 
the validity of a capital sentence. 
COMMENT: This section requires that counsel for the 
prisoner under capital sentence file a federal habeas corpus 
petition within 365 days from the effective date of appointment 
under section 2256. The tolling rule applies while the case is 
pending in state court during post-conviction review there or 
while the case is pending before the Supreme Court if the case is 
taken up following affirmance of the capital sentence on direct 
appeal by the highest court of the state. It does not apply if 
counsel for the prisoner files a certiorari petition following a 
decision of the highest court of the state at the conclusion of 
state post-conviction review. This exception to the tolling rule 
is intended to discourage a repetitive and unnecessary step in 
the death penalty review process. Bear in mind that the Supreme 
court will have a chance to take a final look at every death 
penalty case under this scheme after all lower court post-
conviction review, state and federal, has been finished. 
This section also permits in effect a 60 day extension of 
the 365 day period if counsel for the prisoner can show good 
cause for his inability to file a federal habeas corpus petition 
in time. Some safety valve of this type is probably essential to 
the scheme. It would be particularly important in the event 
appointed counsel turns out to be derelict in the performance of 
his duties. The oversight office of the Chief Justice could find 
substitute counsel and still keep a case on track if there is 
some way to gain extra time. This ground for tolling should not 
be utilized except in the rare instance. The incentive ought to 
be for the states to do their job carefully by making good 
counsel appointments at the front end so that the failure to meet 




section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal review; 
[district court adjudication] [transfer to court 
of appeals for adjudication] 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under capital sentence files a 
petition for habeas corpus relief under this chapter, the 
district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary record 
for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review based on the 
claims actually presented and litigated in the state courts 
except when the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop a claim in the state courts is (A) the result of state 
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable; or (C) based on a 
factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for 
state post-conviction review; and 
(2) consider and rule upon any request for an 
evidentiary hearing and conduct any evidentiary hearing 
necessary to complete the record for the purpose of federal 
habeas corpus review. 
(b) [Upon the development of a complete evidentiary record, 
the district court shall rule on the merits of all claims 
properly before it] [Upon the development of a complete 
evidentiary record, the district court shall certify the record 
to the court of appeals as ripe for the adjudication of all 
claims properly before it]. 
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[(~) Upon the receipt of a record from a district court in a 
case involving a state prisoner under capital sentence, the court 
of appeals shall proceed to consider and resolve all properly 
preserved and presented claims as if the case were on direct 
appeal from a ruling of the district court adverse to the 
petitioner on all claims, including any request for an 
evidentiary where that request was denied by the district 
court.] 
COMMENT: This section makes several significant changes in 
the law. 
First, it modifies the exhaustion doctrine by (a) 
authorizing federal court consideration in capital cases of only 
those issues previously presented to the state courts and (b) 
directing the immediate consideration of those issues once they 
are identified. If a new claim is raised in federal court for 
the first time, it will not be considered at all unless one of 
the exceptions is satisfied. In such an event, the evidentiary 
basis for the new but still assertable claim will be developed in 
federal court and the issue will be resolved there without 
sending it back to the state courts for initial review. This is 
a justified departure from practice under the mixed petition rule 
of Rose v. Lundy. Compliance with Rose v. Lundy consumes 
unnecessary time since state procedural default rules usually 
present a major barrier to the prisoner who returns to state 
court to exhaust with respect to a claim. Why require a 
generally futile step in the interest of promoting comity when it 
undercuts finality in a class of criminal cases where society's 
interest in finality is the highest. 
Second, if additional fact finding needs to be done in order 
to consider any issue properly exhausted in state court, that 
factfinding is to be done by the district court. There will be 
no remand to the state courts for additional factfinding. 
Third, in alternative language, subsections (b) and (c) 
would limit the district court role in death penalty cases to 
making the record ready for adjudication. Once the issues 
properly before the federal courts are identified and the 
evidentiary record is adequately developed, the district court 
would certify the record to the court of appeals for final 
adjudication. This would eliminate the repetitive process of 
having both a district judge and the court of appeals learning 
the record and ruling on the merits. The district judge's 
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ruling, while helpful, is never final. Are both needed given the 
limits on judicial time? 
section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter. 
COMMENT: The certificate of probable cause requirement is 
incompatible with the scheme now under consideration. 
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AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
IN CAPITAL CASES 
Committee Report 
I. Int?-oduction 
Studies of public opinion establish that an overwhelming 
majority of our citizens favors the death penalty for certain 
murders. The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
evolving standards of decency embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment permit imposition of this punishment for some 
offenders. Of course, both the Court and society have rec-
ognized that, because it is irreversible, death is a unique pun-
ishment. This realization demands safeguards to ensure 
that capital punishment is administered with the utmost reli-
ability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-layered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review has led to piecemeal and repe-
titious litigation, and years of delay between sentencing and 
execution. The resulting lack of finality undermines public 
confidence in our criminal justice system. Of course, any 
system of review entails some delay. It is not suggested 
that the delay needed for review of constitutional claims is in-
appropriate. But much of the delay inherent in the present 
system is not needed for fairness. Adding to the problem is 
the fact that prisoners often cannot obtain qualified counsel 
until execution is imminent. The resulting last-minute 
rushed litigation disserves inmates, and saps the resources of 
our judiciary. 
To address these problems, Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist formed this Committee in June 1988. His charge to us 
was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of legisla-
tion directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality" in 
capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been offered 
counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as members of this 
Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief 
Judge Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, District Judge Hodges 
of Florida and District Judge Sanders of Texas. The States 
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have by far the greatest 
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additional litigation over a request for a stay of execution is 
inevitable. 
The existing system also fosters piecemeal and repetitive 
litigation of claims. Because res judicata is inapplicable to 
federal habeas proceedings, many capital litigants return to 
federal court with second-or even third and fourth-peti-
tions for relief. Current rules governing abuse of the writ 
and successive petitions have not served to prevent these 
endless filings. Another example of piecemeal litigation is 
the fact that current rules allow at least three petitions for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court-after direct 
review, after state collateral proceedings, and after federal 
collateral proceedings. 
Few would argue that the current state of death penalty 
administration is satisfactory. There are now approxi-
mately 2,200 convicted murderers on death row awaiting 
execution. Yet since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman de-
cision only 116 executions have taken place. The shortest of 
these judicial proceedings required two years and nine 
months to complete. The longest covered a period of 14 
years and six months. The length of the average proceeding 
was eight years and two months. The Committee does not 
believe eight years are required for the appropriate habeas 
review of state criminal proceedings. 
The Committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of the time 
spent in collateral litigation in death penalty cases occurs out-
side of state collateral proceedings. A table showing the av-
erage time periods and ratios in death penalty cases in these 
States is attached to this report. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well as the 
delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes clear 
that the present system of collateral review operates to frus-
trate the law of 37 States. 1 The collateral review process 
tends to be erratic and frequently is repetitious. The long 
1 Federal law also provides for capital punishment in certain cases. See 
P. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4387 (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988) (murders com-
mittee! in connection with narcotics offenses). 
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C. Last-Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is that liti-
gation of constitutional claims often comes only when 
prompted by the setting of an execution date. Judicial 
resources are expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of 
execution in order to present his claims. Justice may be 
ill-served by conducting judicial proceedings in capital cases 
under the pressure of an impending execution. In some 
cases last-minute habeas corpus petitions have resulted from 
the unavailability of counsel at any earlier time. But in 
other cases attorneys appear to have intentionally delayed fil-
ing until time pressures were severe. In most cases, succes-
sive petitions are meritless, and we believe many are filed at 
the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a rational 
system of justice. The merits of capital cases should be re-
viewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time pres-
sure. This should be true both during state and federal col-
lateral review. But once this review has occurred, absent 
extraordinary circumstances there should be no further last-
minute litigation. 
III. The Committee Proposal 
In response to the problems described above, the Commit-
tee proposes new statutory procedures for federal habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences where counsel has been 
provided. Separate procedures for capital cases are appro-
priate in light of the special problems of capital litigation. 
The incentives facing the capital litigant are unique. The in-
mate under capital sentence, whose guilt frequently is never 
in question, has every incentive to delay the proceedings that 
must take place before that sentence is carried out. Such an 
inmate is avoiding the punishment prescribed by the law of 
the State. In contrast, prisoners serving an ordinary term 
of years have every incentive to bring their claims to resolu-
tion as soon as possible in order to gain relief. And they are 
serving their sentences while litigation takes place. 
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Importantly, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
execution, which is to remain in place until federal habeas 
proceedings are completed, or until the prisoner has failed to 
file a petition within the allotted time. This automatic stay 
ensures that claims need not be evaluated under the time 
pressure of a scheduled execution. It should substantially 
eliminate the rushed litigation over stay motions that is trou-
bling for both litigants and the judiciary. 
Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will encom-
pass only claims that have been exhausted in state court. 
With the counsel provided by the statute, there should be no 
excuse for failure to raise claims in state court. The statute 
departs from current exhaustion practice by allowing for im-
mediate presentation of new claims in federal court in ex-
traordinary circumstances. In the event the entire coun-
seled state and federal collateral process concludes without 
relief being granted, the statute includes new mechanisms to 
promote finality. Subsequent and successive federal habeas 
petitions can no longer be the basis of a stay of execution or 
grant of relief absent extraordinary circumstances and a col-
orable showing of factual innocence. 
IV. Conclusion 
The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system 
is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness requires 
that a defendant be provided a searching and impartial 
examination of his claims. Fairness also requires that if a 
defendant's claims are found to be devoid of merit after such 
examination, society is rightfully entitled to have the penalty 
prescribed by law carried out without unreasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to competent coun-
sel at state trial and appeal and, under recent congressional 
enactment, in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Com-
mittee's proposal seeks to fill a gap that now exists by en-
couraging the appointment of competent counsel also in state 
habeas or collateral proceedings. The proposal further as-
sures that, upon completion of state proceedings, a defendant 




CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions 
[a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
Subchapter B. Capital Cases: Special Procedures 
[new] 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to cap-
ital sentence; appointment of counsel; 
requirement of rule of court or statute; 
procedures for appointment. 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under sec-
tion 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the provi-
sions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied. 
(b) This subchapter is applicable if a State establishes by 
rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 
the appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses of competent counsel in state post-convic-
tion proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital 
convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal 
to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise be-
come final for state law purposes. The rule of court or stat-
ute must provide standards of competency for the appoint-
ment of such counsel. 
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation 
and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) 
must offer counsel to all state prisoners under capital sen-
tence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of 
record: (1) appointing one or more counsel to represent the 
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prisoner to a single opportunity for federal habeas corpus re-
view under section 2254. This limitation would advance the 
state interest in the finality of criminal convictions and capi-
tal sentences. But to avail itself of subchapter B's more 
structured habeas corpus review procedures, a State would 
have to establish a system for the appointment and com-
pensation of competent counsel throughout all stages of state 
post conviction review. The purpose of this mechanism is to 
assure that collateral review will be fair, thorough, and the 
product of capable and committed advocacy. While 
subchapter B attempts to strike a realistic balance between 
the values of judicial efficiency and procedural fairness in the 
context of a federal system, it does not impose a solution on 
the States. Each State must assess the utility of subchapter 
B for itself. Unless a State takes the affirmative steps re-
quired in sections 2256(b) and (c), its litigation of capital cases 
under section 2254 will be governed by the statutory and 
court rules that presently apply to all federal habeas corpus 
cases. 
Central to efficacy of this scheme is the development of 
standards governing the competency of counsel chosen to 
serve in this specialized and demanding area of litigation. 
This mechanism is to be established by state statute or by 
mle of the state court of last resort. The Committee be-
lieves that it is more consistent with the federal-state balance 
to give the States wide latitude to establish a mechanism that 
complies with subsection (b). The final judgment as to the 
adequacy of any system for the appointment of counsel under 
subsection (b), however, rests ultimately with the federal ju-
diciary. If prisoners under capital sentence in a particular 
State doubt that a State's mechanism for appointing counsel 
comports with subsection (b), the adequacy of the system-as 
opposed to the competency of particular counsel- can be set-
tled through litigation. 
If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, the 
state mechanism must offer counsel to all state prisoners 
under capital sentence. In addition, it must provide for the 
entry of an appropriate judicial order based on the state pris-
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(d) would permit, though not require, continued representa-
tion if the prisoner and his counsel expressly make a request 
to the appointing authority established by the State. 
Subsection (e) provides that the ineffectiveness or incom-
petence of counsel during state or federal post-conviction re-
view in a capital case is not a ground for relief in section 2254 
proceedings. This rule reflects settled constitutional doc-
trine which limits ineffective assistance of counsel challenges 
to those criminal proceedings to which the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 
2765 (1989), Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551 (1987). 
The Committee recognizes that the competence of counsel 
during all stages of state and federal post-conviction review 
is of the utmost importance in capital cases. However, as 
far as federal review in a proceeding under section 2254 is 
concerned, it believes that the focus should be on the per-
formance of a capital defendant's trial and appellate counsel. 
The provision of counsel under the new statute therefore 
does not involve the creation of any potential claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in collateral review. The effective-
ness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is a matter 
that can and must be dealt with in the appointment process. 
Only one who has the clear ability and willingness to handle 
capital cases should be appointed under subsections (b) and 
(c). If at any any time during state or federal post-convic-
tion review it appears that appointed counsel is unable to dis-
charge his obligations in a timely and competent manner, the 
remedy is for the court to appoint a replacement, and to per-
mit post-conviction review to go forward. 
Section 2257. Mandatory state of execution; duration; 
limits on stays of execution; successive 
petitions. 
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate state court of 
record of an order pursuant to section 2256(c), a warrant or 
order setting an execution date for a state prisoner shall be 
stayed upon application to any court that would have juris-
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(2) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively appli-
cable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence in time to present the claim for state or federal 
post-conviction review; and 
(3) The facts underlying the claim would be suffi-
cient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in 
the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or of-
fenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
COMMENT: This subchapter rests on the assumption that 
every state prisoner under capital sentence should have one 
opportunity for full state and federal post-conviction review 
before being subject to execution. Although this appears to 
have been the practice in capital cases since Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), it has never been formally recog-
nized as such. Many state prisoners under capital sentence 
have struggled to secure a stay of execution-often against 
· the vigorous opposition of the State-before availing them-
selves of even one chance to pursue state and federal post-
conviction review. Stay of execution litigation often has 
been subject to tight deadlines , and places unrealistic de-
mands on judges, lawyers, and the prisoner. 
If applicable, section 2257 would eliminate stay of execu-
tion litigation during a state prisoner's first request for post-
conviction relief. It provides for a mandatory stay of execu-
tion in capital cases at any time following the appointment of 
counsel pursuant to section 2256(c). If an execution date has 
been set, the prisoner can obtain a stay as a matter of right 
simply by making application to any federal court that would 
have jurisdiction over the case in a proceeding brought under 
section 2254. In practice, however, even this step is not 
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tal sentence, it is the Committee's belief that federal review 
should end. 
In subsection (b)(3), the authority of a federal court to stay 
the execution of a state prisoner expires if there is a waiver 
of the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
2254. To eliminate doubt about the validity of the waiver, 
subsection (b)(3) requires that the prisoner announce the de-
cision before a court of competent jurisdiction and in the 
presence of his counsel. It also requires the court-which 
can be state or federal - to advise the prisoner of the conse-
quences of the waiver decision. 
After the occurrence of one of the conditions resulting in 
the expiration of the right to a mandatory stay of execution 
under subsection (b)(2), federal review in capital cases pursu-
ant to section 2254 is extremely limited. Subsection (c) 
would thereafter permit a stay of execution and the grant of 
relief in a capital case only if: (1) the claim has never been 
raised in state or federal court previously; (2) there is a valid 
excuse for not discovering and raising the claim during the 
prisoner's initial opportunity for state and federal post-
conviction review; and (3) the facts underlying the claim raise 
a serious doubt about the prisoner's guilt of the offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
The third of these conditions is clearly the most important. 
In the Committee's view, ifthere is any doubt about the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
state prisoner's initial attempt to obtain post-conviction re-
view. Often factual guilt is not seriously in dispute. Both 
the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive to ask 
whether all relevant information in mitigation of punishment 
was presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial 
was otherwise conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. 
Given the clear incentive to do this, the Committee does not 
believe that the federal courts should have to consider a sec-
ond petition under section 2254 which challenges only the 
sentencing phase in a capital case. As subsection (c) re-
flects, the only appropriate exception is when the new claim 
goes to the underlying guilt or innocence of the state prisoner 
REPORT 
19 
(c) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
counsel for the state prisoner: (1) moves for an extension of 
time in the federal district court that would have proper ju-
risdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus pe-
tition under section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good 
cause for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition 
within the 180 day period established by this section. 
COMMENT: Section 2258 requires a state prisoner under 
capital sentence to file a section 2254 petition within 180 days 
from the entry of an order under section 2256(c). In almost 
all cases, this will be an order appointing counsel to initiate 
state post-conviction review. But even if a state prisoner is 
not entitled to the appointment of counsel or simply rejects 
the State's offer of appointment, the 180 day period applies to 
all capital cases if the State is subject to this subchapter. 
In death penalty jurisdictions, the sole incentive for a pris-
oner to initiate post-conviction review is either the schedul-
ing of an execution date or the threat to schedule one. The 
disadvantages of this method of administering capital litiga-
tion persuaded the Committee to recommend the mandatory 
stay of execution provisions in section 2257. But it is clear 
that there must be some substitute mechanism to cause 
understandably reluctant state prisoners to seek post-
conviction review when such action may remove the only 
obstacle preventing the State from carrying out the death 
sentence. 
The entry of an order under section 2256(c) is such a substi-
tute. It begins the running of the filing period in capital liti-
gation. Unless the state prisoner actively litigates his case 
after his conviction and capital sentence have become final on 
direct appeal, he risks losing the right to file a section 2254 
petition in federal court. Thus, the 180 day filing require-
ment serves the state interest in promoting finality in capital 
cases. At the same time, this subchapter serves to advance 
that interest only if the State provides prisoners under capi-
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all state post-conviction review has been completed, includ-
ing review by the court of last resort, the 180 day period be-
gins to run again if the capital sentence is undisturbed. The 
next step for the state prisoner is to file a section 2254 peti-
tion in federal district court. If counsel for the state pris-
oner properly discharges his responsibilities, default under 
the 180 day rule will not occur. 
In the event that counsel experiences some difficulty in fil-
ing a section 2254 petition on time, subsection (c) authorizes a 
60 day extension upon a showing of good cause in the federal 
district that would have jurisdiction over the section 2254 
petition when ultimately filed. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal 
review; district court adjudication. 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence 
files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this 
subchapter applies, the district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
record for habeas corpus review based on the claims ac-
tually presented and litigated in the state courts except 
when the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop a claim in the state courts is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
Untied States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively ap-
plicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reason-
able diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing neces-




of its criminal convictions. The Committee believes that the 
States would prefer to see post-conviction litigation go for-
ward in capital cases, even if that entails a minor subordina-
tion of their interest in comity as it is expressed in the ex-
haustion doctrine. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter except when a second or successive petition 
is filed. 
COMMENT: The premise of this subchapter is that a state 
prisoner under capital sentence is entitled to one opportunity 
for state and federal post-conviction review before being sub-
ject to execution. Consistent with this premise, the Com-
mittee believes that in a section 2254 proceeding, a state pris-
oner should be allowed to appeal from the district court to the 
court of appeals as a matter of right. With one exception, 
section 2260 eliminates the certificate of probable cause re-
quirement in cases to which this subchapter is applicable. 
The exception arises when a second or successive petition is 
filed. Even if such a petition is authorized under the provi-
sions of section 2257(c), the right to appeal in that instance 
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IN CAPITAL CASES 
Committee Report 
I. Introduction 
Studies of public opinion establish that an overwhelming 
majority of our citizens favors the death penalty for certain 
murders. The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
evolving standards of decency embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment permit imposition of this punishment for some 
offenders. Of course, both the Court and society have rec-
ognized that, because it is irreversible, death is a unique pun-
ishment. This realization demands safeguards to ensure 
that capital punishment is administered with the utmost reli-
ability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-layered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review has led to piecemeal and repe-
titious litigation, and years of delay between sentencing and 
a judicial resolution as to whether the sentence was permissi-
ble under the law. The resulting lack of finality undermines 
public confidence in our criminal justice system. Of course, 
any system of review entails some delay. It is not suggested 
that the delay needed for review of constitutional claims is 
inappropriate. But much of the delay inherent in the pres-
ent system is not needed for fairness. Adding to the prob-
lem is the fact that prisoners often cannot obtain qualified 
counsel until execution is imminent. The resulting last-
minute rushed litigation disserves inmates, and saps the re-
sources of our judiciary. 
To address these problems, Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist formed this Committee in June 1988. His charge to us 
was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of legisla~ 
tion directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality" in 
capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been offered 
counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as members of this 
Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief 
Judge Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, District Judge Hodges 






additional litigation over a request for a stay of execution is 
inevitable. 
The existing system also fosters piecemeal and repetitive 
litigation of claims. Because res judicata is inapplicable to 
federal habeas proceedings, many capital litigants return to 
federal court with second-or even third and fourth-peti-
tions for relief. Current rules governing abuse of the writ 
and successive petitions have not served to prevent these 
endless filings. Another example of piecemeal litigation is 
the fact that current rules allow at least three petitions for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court-after direct 
review, after state collateral proceedings, and after federal 
collateral proceedings. 
Few would argue that the current state of death penalty 
administration is satisfactory. There are now approxi-
mately 2,200 convicted murderers on death row awaiting 
execution. Yet since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman de-
cision only 116 executions have taken place. The shortest 
of these judicial proceedings required two years and nine 
months to complete. The longest covered a period of 14 
years and six months. The length of the average proceeding 
was eight years and two months. The Committee does not 
believe eight years are required for the appropriate habeas 
review of state criminal proceedings. 
The Committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of the time 
spent in collateral litigation in death penalty cases occurs out-
side of state collateral proceedings. A table showing the av-
erage time periods and ratios in death penalty cases in these 
States is attached to this report. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well as the 
delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes clear 
that the present system of collateral review operates to frus-
trate the law of 37 States. 1 The collateral review process 
tends to be erratic and frequently is repetitious. The long 
' Federal law also provides for capital punishment in certain cases. See 
P. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4387 (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988) (murders com-






C. Last-Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is that 
litigation of constitutional claims of ten comes only when 
prompted by the setting of an execution date. Judicial 
resources are expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of 
execution in order to present his claims. Justice may be 
ill-served by conducting judicial proceedings in capital cases 
under the pressure of an impending execution. In some 
cases last-minute habeas corpus petitions have resulted from 
the unavailability of counsel at any earlier time. But in 
other cases attorneys appear to have intentionally delayed fil-
ing until time pressures were severe. In most cases, succes-
sive petitions are meritless, and we believe many are filed at 
the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a rational 
system of justice. The merits of capital cases should be re-
viewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time pres-
sure. This should be true both during state and federal col-
lateral review. But once this review has occurred, absent 
extraordinary circumstances there should be no further last-
minute litigation. 
III. The Committee Proposal 
In response to the problems described above, the Commit-
tee proposes new statutory procedures for federal habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences where counsel has been 
provided. Separate procedures for capital cases are appro-
priate in light of the special problems of capital litigation. 
The incentives facing the capital litigant are unique. The in-
mate under capital sentence, whose guilt frequently is never 
in question, has every incentive to delay the proceedings that 
must take place before that sentence is carried out. Such an 
inmate is avoiding the punishment prescribed by the law of 
the State. In contrast, prisoners serving an ordinary term 
of years have every incentive to bring their claims to resolu-
tion as soon as possible in order to gain relief. And they are 






Importantly, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
execution, which is to remain in place until federal habeas 
proceedings are completed, or until the prisoner has failed to 
file a petition within the allotted time. This automatic stay 
ensures that claims need not be evaluated under the time 
pressure of a scheduled execution. It should substantially 
eliminate the rushed litigation over stay motions that is trou-
bling for both litigants and the judiciary. 
Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will encom-
pass only claims that have been exhausted in state court. 
With the counsel provided by the statute, there should be no 
excuse for failure to raise claims in state court. The statute 
departs from current exhaustion practice by allowing for im-
mediate presentation of new claims in federal court in ex-
traordinary circumstances. In the event the entire coun-
seled state and federal collateral process concludes without 
relief being granted, the statute includes new mechanisms to 
promote finality. Subsequent and successive federal habeas 
petitions can no longer be the basis of a stay of execution 
or grant of relief absent extraordinary circumstances and a 
colorable showing of factual innocence. 
IV. Conclusion 
The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system 
is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness requires 
that a defendant be provided a searching and impartial 
examination of his claims. Fairness also requires that if a 
defendant's claims are found to be devoid of merit after such 
examination, society is rightfully entitled to have the penalty 
prescribed by law carried out without unreasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to competent coun-
sel at state trial and appeal and, under recent congressional 
enactment, in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Com-
mittee's proposal seeks to fill a gap that now exists by en-
couraging the appointment of competent counsel also in state 
habeas or collateral proceedings. The proposal further as-
sures that, upon completion of state proceedings, a defendant 







CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions 
[a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
Subchapter B. Capital Cases: Special Procedures 
[new] 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to cap-
ital sentence; appointment of counsel; 
requirement of rule of court or statute; 
procedures for appointment. 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under sec-
tion 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the provi-
sions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied. 
(b) This subchapter is applicable if a State establishes by 
rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 
the appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses of competent counsel in state post-convic-
tion proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital 
convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal 
to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise be-
come final for state law purposes. The rule of court or stat-
ute must provide standards of competency for the appoint-
ment of such counsel. 
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation 
and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) 
must offer counsel to all state prisoners under capital sen-
tence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of 






prisoner to a single opportunity for federal habeas corpus re-
view under section 2254. This limitation would advance the 
state interest in the finality of criminal convictions and capi-
tal sentences. But to avail itself of subchapter B's more 
structured habeas corpus review procedures, a State would 
have to establish a system for the appointment and com-
pensation of competent counsel throughout all stages of state 
post conviction review. The purpose of this mechanism is 
to assure that collateral review will be fair, thorough, and 
the product of capable and committed advocacy. While 
subchapter B attempts to strike a realistic balance between 
the values of judicial efficiency and procedural fairness in the 
context of a federal system, it does not impose a solution on 
the States. Each State must assess the utility of subchapter 
B for itself. Unless a State takes the affirmative steps re-
quired in sections 2256(b) and (c), its litigation of capital cases 
under section 2254 will be governed by the statutory and 
court rules that presently apply to all federal habeas corpus 
cases. 
Central to efficacy of this scheme is the development of 
standards governing the competency of counsel chosen to 
serve in this specialized and demanding area of litigation. 
This mechanism is to be established by state statute or by 
rule of the state court of last resort. The Committee be-
lieves that it is more consistent with the federal-state balance 
to give the States wide latitude to establish a mechanism that 
complies with subsection (b). The final judgment as to the 
adequacy of any system for the appointment of counsel under 
subsection (b), however, rests ultimately with the federal 
judiciary. If prisoners under capital sentence in a particular 
State doubt that a State's mechanism for appointing counsel 
comports with subsection (b), the adequacy of the system-as 
opposed to the competency of particular counsel-can be set-
tled through litigation. 
If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, the 
state mechanism must offer counsel to all state prisoners 
under capital sentence. In addition, it must provide for the 






(d) would permit, though not require, continued representa-
tion if the prisoner and his counsel expressly make a request 
to the appointing authority established by the State. 
Subsection (e) provides that the ineffectiveness or incom-
petence of counsel during state or federal post-conviction re-
view in a capital case is not a ground for relief in section 2254 
proceedings. This rule reflects settled constitutional doc-
trine which limits ineffective assistance of counsel challenges 
to those criminal proceedings to which the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 
2765 (1989), Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551 (1987). 
The Committee recognizes that the competence of counsel 
during all stages of state and federal post-conviction review 
is of the utmost importance in capital cases. However, as 
far as federal review in a proceeding under section 2254 is 
concerned, it believes that the focus should be on the per-
formance of a capital defendant's trial and appellate counsel. 
The provision of counsel under the new statute therefore 
does not involve the creation of any potential claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in collateral review. The effective-
ness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is a matter 
that can and must be dealt with in the appointment process. 
Only one who has the clear ability and willingness to handle 
capital cases should be appointed under subsections (b) and 
(c). If at any any time during state or federal post-convic-
tion review it appears that appointed counsel is unable to dis-
charge his obligations in a timely and competent manner, the 
remedy is for the court to appoint a replacement, and to per-
mit post-conviction review to go forward. 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; 
limits on stays of execution; successive 
petitions. 
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate state court of 
record of an order pursuant to section 2256(c), a warrant or 
order setting an execution date for a state prisoner shall be 






(2) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively appli-
cable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence in time to present the claim for state or federal 
post-conviction review; and 
(3) The facts underlying the claim would be suffi-
cient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in 
the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or of-
fenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
COMMENT: This subchapter rests on the assumption that 
every state prisoner under capital sentence should have one 
opportunity for full state and federal post-conviction review 
before being subject to execution. Although this appears to 
have been the practice in capital cases since Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), it has never been formally recog-
nized as such. Many state prisoners under capital sentence 
have struggled to secure a stay of execution- of ten against 
the vigorous opposition of the State - before availing them-
selves of even one chance to pursue state and federal post-
conviction review. Stay of execution litigation often has 
been subject to tight deadlines, and places unrealistic de-
mands on judges, lawyers, and the prisoner. 
If applicable, section 2257 would eliminate stay of execu-
tion litigation during a state prisoner's first request for post-
conviction relief. It provides for a mandatory stay of execu-
tion in capital cases at any time following the appointment of 
counsel pursuant to section 2256(c). If an execution date has 
been set, the prisoner can obtain a stay as a matter of right 
simply by making application to any federal court that would 
have jurisdiction over the case in a proceeding brought under 






tal sentence, it is the Committee's belief that federal review 
should end. 
In subsection (b)(3), the authority of a federal court to stay 
the execution of a state prisoner expires if there is a waiver 
of the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
2254. To eliminate doubt about the validity of the waiver, 
subsection (b)(3) requires that the prisoner announce the de-
cision before a court of competent jurisdiction and in the 
presence of his counsel. It also requires the court -which 
can be state or federal-to advise the prisoner of the conse-
quences of the waiver decision. 
After the occurrence of one of the conditions resulting in 
the expiration of the right to a mandatory stay of execution 
under subsection (b)(2), federal review in capital cases pur-
suant to section 2254 is extremely limited. Subsection (c) 
would thereafter permit a stay of execution and the grant of 
relief in a capital case only if: (1) the claim has never been 
raised in state or federal court previously; (2) there is a valid 
excuse for not discovering and raising the claim during the 
prisoner's initial opportunity for state and federal post-
conviction review; and (3) the facts underlying the claim raise 
a serious doubt about the prisoner's guilt of the offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
The third of these conditions is clearly the most important. 
In the Committee's view, if there is any doubt about the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
state prisoner's initial attempt to obtain post-conviction re-
view. Often factual guilt is not seriously in dispute. Both 
the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive to ask 
whether all relevant information in mitigation of punishment 
was presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial 
was otherwise conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. 
Given the clear incentive to do this, the Committee does not 
believe that the federal courts should have to consider a sec-
ond petition under section 2254 which challenges only the 
sentencing phase in a capital case. As subsection (c) re-






jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good 
cause for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition 
within the 180 day period established by this section. 
COMMENT: Section 2258 requires a state prisoner under 
capital sentence to file a section 2254 petition within 180 days 
from the entry of an order under section 2256(c). In almost 
all cases, this will be an order appointing counsel to initiate 
state post-conviction review. But even if a state prisoner is 
not entitled to the appointment of counsel or simply rejects 
the State's offer of appointment, the 180 day period applies to 
all capital cases if the State is subject to this subchapter. 
In death penalty jurisdictions, the sole incentive for a pris-
oner to initiate post-conviction review is either the schedul-
ing of an execution date or the threat to schedule one. The 
disadvantages of this method of administering capital litiga-
tion persuaded the Committee to recommend the mandatory 
stay of execution provisions in section 2257. But it is clear 
that there must be some substitute mechanism to cause 
understandably reluctant state prisoners to seek post-
conviction review when such action may remove the only 
obstacle preventing the State from carrying out the death 
sentence. 
The entry of an order under section 2256(c) is such a substi-
tute. It begins the running of the filing period in capital liti-
gation. Unless the state prisoner actively litigates his case 
after his conviction and capital sentence have become final on 
direct appeal, he risks losing the right to file a section 2254 
petition in federal court. Thus, the 180 day filing require-
ment serves the state interest in promoting finality in capital 
cases. At the same time, this subchapter serves to advance 
that interest only if the State provides prisoners under capi-
tal sentence with the means-competent counsel at state ex-
pense-to assert their legal rights in state post-conviction 






ing review by the court of last resort, the 180 day period be-
gins to run again if the capital sentence is undisturbed. The 
next step for the state prisoner is to file a section 2254 peti-
tion in federal district court. If counsel for the state pris-
oner properly discharges his responsibilities, default under 
the 180 day rule will not occur. 
In the event that counsel experiences some difficulty in fil-
ing a section 2254 petition on time, subsection (c) authorizes a 
60 day extension upon a showing of good cause in the federal 
district that would have jurisdiction over the section 2254 
petition when ultimately filed. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal 
review; district court adjudication. 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence 
files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this sub-
chapter applies, the district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
record for habeas corpus review based on the claims ac-
tually presented and litigated in the state courts except 
when the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop a claim in the state courts is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
Untied States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively ap-
plicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reason-
able diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing neces-






sults in delay and undermines the state interest in the finality 
of its criminal convictions. The Committee believes that the 
States would prefer to see post-conviction litigation go for-
ward in capital cases, even if that entails a minor subordina-
tion of their interest in comity as it is expressed in the ex-
haustion doctrine. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter except when a second or successive petition 
is filed. 
COMMENT: The premise of this subchapter is that a state 
prisoner under capital sentence is entitled to one opportunity 
for state and federal post-conviction review before being sub-
ject to execution. Consistent with this premise, the Com-
mittee believes that in a section 2254 proceeding, a state pris-
oner should be allowed to appeal from the district court to the 
court of appeals as a matter of right. With one exception, 
section 2260 eliminates the certificate of probable cause re-
quirement in cases to which this subchapter is applicable. 
The exception arises when a second or successive petition is 
filed. Even if such a petition is authorized under the provi-
sions of section 2257(c), the right to appeal in that instance 
will be governed by section 2253 rather than section 2260. 
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The Chr~ Justice suggested that I make a 
brief statement about the work of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases. The Chief Justice created this Committee 
in June 1988, and asked me to chair it. 
Other members of the Committee were Chief 
Judges Charles Clark and Paul Roney, and District 
Judges Terry Hodges of Florida and Barefoot 
Sanders of Texas. Each of these judges serves in 
the Fifth or Eleventh Circuits, whose States have 
the greatest numbers of prisoners under capital 
sentence. 
Professor Al Pearson of the University of 
Georgia Law School, who has had experience 
representing def~ndants in capital cases, served 
as Reporter. Bill Burchill of the Administrative 
Office served as Secretary. 
R ~Is fl_~ f-
2 . 
The Committee's Report, dated August 23, 
/ with drafts of proposed legislation j has been sent 
to each of you. In view of the mass of papers 
members of the Conference have to consider, it may 
be helpful if I comment briefly on the problem and 
what the Committee recommends. 
I think you will ~ agree that the 
present system of post-conviction review jin 
capital cases/ is unsatisfactory. It neither 
provides sufficient protections for prisoners/nor 
adequately recognizes the states' interest in 
finality. The hard fact is that the laws of 37 
states/ are not being enforced by the courts. 
/----~ About 20,000 murders are committed in our 
count ry each year. Only a fraction of the worst 
." ~~ 
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murdere~ s - even those convicted - are sentenced 
' 
to die. A 
There are now approximately 2,200 
convicted murderers on death row awaiting 
execution. Since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman 
decision only 116 executions have taken place. -~ 
The average length of time between conviction and 
execution has been more than eight years. Delay 
b~ ~ ~ ~~c4.. 
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of this magnitude /i s hardly necessary for fairness 
or for thorough review. 
A major problem with the present system/ 
is the need for qualified counsel to represent 
indigent prisoners at all stages. As you know, 
the Constitution requires counsel for the trial 
and direct review.1/A new federal statute requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in 
capital cases. But his leaves a serious gap in 
some state collateral systems. 
Another aspect of the present system 
causes related problems. In most states/ the . 
setting of an execution date/ now provides the -W 
~ entive for the condemned prisoner/ to initiate 
~ post-conviction review. As a result,~ ng 
~ 
happens until a date is set. Then counsel is 
appo~nted or found / and urgent efforts are made to 
stay execution. 
Capital litigation is distinctly 
different from other criminal cases. Typically, 
there are long periods of inactivity,/ followed by 
hurried eleventh hour activity. This last-minute 
A-lt-j ~ 
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litigation/ does not comport with the sober and 
deliberate review that is appropriate. 
I respect those who argue for outright 
abolition of death punishment. But it seems --- ----
irrational to retain the penalty / and frustrate 
its fair implementation. 
X XX 
The Committee proposes new statutory 
procedures that would apply in capital cases. Of 
course, Congress is free to legislate with _respect 
to review of state convictions/ by federal habeas 
corpus.J7Habeas corpus for s~ prisoners is not 
mentioned in the Constitution. It was created by 
Congress by statute in 1867. 
Separate procedures are appropriate for 
capital litigation because it is uni que. The 
incentives facing a capital defendany di!.£er from 
those facing the ordinary prisoner. The prisoner 
serving a term/seeks speedy review. But delay is 
the objective of one sentenced to death. 
The aim of - our proposal/ is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to ~ e fair/ and 
complete course/ of collateral review through the 





free from the time pressure / of an impending 
) -trt:~-
executioi and ~ ith the assistance of competent 
counsel ~f~ ~ the Drisener. When this review has 
concluded,/ litigation should end. 
~+- ~ is proposal would not be binding on a 
/\, 
5. 
state. It would allow a State to elect to bring 
collateral litigation,/ involving its capital 
prisoners/ within the scope of the new statute. A 
state could do this by providing competent counsel 
in state post-conviction review. 
The proposal would reduce unnecessary 
delay by providing a time limi1/on the filing of 
federal habeas petitions. The time limit would 
have to~ e ( that ensure ample time for the 
presentation and consideration of all claims. 
Finality would be enhancedf>y limiting the 
circumstances in which federal relief may be 
sought/ ~ er one full course of litigation up to 
the Supreme Court. 
In addition to competent counsel, the new 
proposal provides other measures to protect the 
rights of prisoners. An automatic stay of 
execution/ is provided during the course of review 
Iv ~ ~ 
~ -
to eliminate time pressure. And the certificate 
of probable cause is eliminated to provide for 
automatic review by the Court of Appeals. 
X X X' 
Two members of the Conference have 
expressed some concern about two aspects of our 
proposal. I say a few words about each. 
6 • 
First, the proposal limits subsequeny1and 
successive applications for federal habeas relief 
to claims of innocence of the crime itself. It 
does not allow the prisoner to use a repeat 
petition to challenge the senten~e alone. 
In my view, this provision, in §2257(c), 
is vital to providing finality. Allowing 
repetitive challenges to the sentence would be far 
different from providing an exception for claims 
of innocence. 
Unlike evidence about the crime, / which 
turns on historical ~ t / mitigating evidence - as 
this Court has held - can be unlimited. It may 
include speculation/and facts only dimly 
Gi..-t., ~ ~..4.-y-~/ 
remembered. New "expert" witnesses are easy to - /\ 
find. 
lf J I- ~ ~ ~11~~ 
7 • 
It has been suggested / that not allowing 
an exception to challenge the sentence where the 
state has withheld evidence of mitigation,/ would 
run counter to Brady v. Maryland. But meritorious 
claims of withholding sentencing evidence/ are 
extremely rare. 
~ 1-1,....c._,/- . (_ A__a,,v 
Our proposal t}-i.:v.e ~ the prisonerA counsel ) 
and an automatic stay for one full course of - - -----
review. It is fair to require any challenge to 
the sentence to be raised at this time. 
A second concern mentioned is that the 
180 day limitations period is too short. The 
period includes only time when no litigation is 
taking place,/and the period starts to run ~ y 
when a lawyer is appointed. 
There also is a provision for a 60-day 
extension when necessary. The prisoner will have 
assistance of counsel. The time for preparation 
is therefore ample. 
I note that, / although there has been no 
serious time limit on habeas/ in the past, the 
180-day period is far longer than afforded for 
f-~ ~?-,fa-e_ 
trf /LI-~ (7'y ~ 
~d. 
taking any type of state or federal appeal, 
including cert petitions. ~---~-L-~ .. ,_ 
X x- )ii. (. ~¥'--~ 
In conclusion, I n-o-eeJ that the 
fundamental requirement of a justice system is 
fairness in individual cases. Where the death 
this means a searching and 
..&_~0-L 
8 • 
penal_ty is involved 
impartial review of the propriety of the sentence. 
" Fairness also requires that if a 




society is entitled to have a lawful penalty 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l.U'l .. i-&.A.~ 
carried out without unreasonable delay. 
/\ /\ L-,,.. L_~~ 
I thank the Conference for allowing me to 
present this Repor(f/ -our reporter Professor Al 
Pearson, is here. He deserves much of the credit 
for the careful drafting of the 
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT 
The Chief Justice suggested that I make a brief 
statement about the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases. The Chief Justice created 
this Committee in June 1988, and asked me to chair it. 
Other members of the Committee were Chief Judges 
Charles Clark and Paul Roney, and District Judges Terry 
Hodges of Florida and Barefoot Sanders of Texas. Each of 
these judges serves in the Fifth or Eleventh Circuits, whose 
States have the greatest numbers of prisoners under capital 
sentence. 
Professor Al Pearson of the University of Georgia 
Law School, who has experience representing defendants in 
• 
2 . 
capital cases, served as Reporter. Bill Burchill of the 
Administrative Office served as Secretary. 
The Committee's Report, dated August 23, with 
drafts of proposed legislation, has been sent to each of 
you. In view of the mass of papers members of the 
Conference have to consider, it may be helpful if I comment 
briefly on the problem and what the Committee recommends. 
Capital punishment is authorized in 37 states and 
by the Congress. The hard fact is that the laws of the 
states are not being enforced by the courts. The dual 
system of state and federal post-conviction review has 
resulted in repetitive delays that reflect seriously upon 
our judicial system. 
I mention the cold facts. I use round numbers but 
they are substantially accurate. The United States has by 
far the highest murder rate among the world's democracies. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our country each year. 
.. 
3. 
Only a fraction of the murderers - even those convicted -
are sentenced to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 convicted 
murderers on death row awaiting execution. Since the 
Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision only 116 executions 
have taken place. In view of repetitive collateral review, 
the average length of time between conviction and execution 
has been more than eight years. 
In these circumstances, no one reasonably could 
argue that the present situation is satisfactory. After 
thorough study, we recommend changes that would preserve the 
utmost fairness but also tend to assure that valid laws are 
enforced. 
The Committee identified the causes of the delay 
problem. First among these is the need for competent 
counsel to represent the capital prisoner throughout 
collateral proceedings. The Constitution requires 
4 . 
counsel for the trial and direct review. A new federal 
statute requires appointment of counsel on federal habeas in 
capital cases. This leaves a serious gap in some state 
collateral systems. The Committee recognizes the difficulty 
of obtaining counsel to represent inmates on collateral 
review, and believes provision of counsel at every stage of 
this process is essential for fairness. 
Another aspect of the present system causes several 
related problems. In most states the setting of an 
execution date now provides the only incentive for the 
condemned prisoner to initiate post-conviction review. As a 
result, nothing happens until a date is set. Then counsel 
is appointed or found, and last minute efforts are made to 
stay execution. 
Often this is the beginning of the filing of 
successive federal habeas petitions - typically when a new 
execution date is set. These petitions usually are 
5 . 
meritless, and often appear to be filed purely for purposes 
of delay. 
To alleviate these problems, we propose new 
statutory procedures that will apply in capital cases. 
Separate procedures are appropriate, for capital litigation 
is unique. The incentives facing a capital defendant differ 
from those facing the ordinary prisoner. Delay becomes the 
objective of one sentenced to death. 
The aim of the proposal is this: Capital cases 
should be subject to one fair and complete course of 
collateral review through the state and federal systems. 
This review should be free from the time pressure of an 
impending execution and with the assistance of competent 
counsel for the prisoner. When this review has concluded, 
litigation should end. 
The proposal is not binding on a state. It allows a 
State to elect to bring collateral litigation, involving its 
6 • 
prisoners, within the scope of the new statute by providing 
competent counsel in state post-conviction review. In 
addition, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
execution to ensure that review takes place without time 
pressure. 
The proposal attempts to reduce unnecessary delay 
by introducing a time limit on the filing of federal habeas 
petitions, but a time limit with tolling rules that ensure 
ample time for the presentation and consideration of all 
claims. 
Redundant steps in the process are minimized by 
these tolling rules and changes to the exhaustion 
requirement. And finality is enhanced by limiting the 
circumstances in which federal relief may be sought after 
one full course of litigation up to the Supreme Court. 
The Committee believes that subsequent and 
successive federal petitions should be limited to cases of 
factual innocence. 
7 • 
I would emphasize that the provisions of 
the proposal are all important to the result it seeks to 
achieve. 
In conclusion, I note that the fundamental 
requirement of a justice system is fairness in individual 
cases. Where the death penalty is involved this means a 
searching and impartial review of the propriety of the 
sentence. 
But fairness also requires that where the sentence 
is found to be lawful, society is entitled to have the 
penalty carried out without unreasonable delay. We believe 
our proposal can do much to enhance fairness in capital 
litigation. 
I thank the Conference for allowing me to present 
this Report. Our reporter Professor Al Pearson, deserves 
much of the credit for the careful drafting of the proposed 
new statutes. My law clerk, Hewitt Pate, also is available. 
• 
8. 
He attended all six of the Committee meetings, and 
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AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
IN CAPITAL CASES 
Committee Report 
I. Introduction 
Studies of public opinion establish that an overwhelming 
majority of our citizens favors the death penalty for certain 
murders. The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
evolving standards of decency embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment permit imposition of this punishment for some 
offenders. Of course, both the Court and society have rec-
ognized that, because it is irreversible, death is a unique pun-
ishment. This realization demands safeguards to ensure 
that capital punishment is administered with the utmost reli-
ability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-la~ered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review hiFs"'fecI- to""p ifcemealana fepe-
titious"'litigation,'"" and years of delay between sentencing and 
a judicial resolution as towhetner the sentence was permissi-
ble under the law. The resulting lack of finality undermines 
public confidence in our criminal j ustice system. '"""of course, 
any system of review entails some delay. TI is not suggested 
that the delay needed for review of constitutional claims is 
inappropriate. But much of the delay inherent in the pres-
ent system is u..ot needed f2_r fairness. Adding to the prob-
lem is the fact~ cannot obtain qualified 
counsel until execution is imminent. The resulting last-
minute rushed litigation disserves inmates, and saps the re-
sources of our judiciary. 
To address these problems, Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist formed this Committee in June 1988. His charge to us 
was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of legisla-
tion directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality" in 
capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been offered 
counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as members of this 
Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief 
Judge Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, District Judge Hodges 
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in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have by far the greatest 
numbers of prisoners subject to capital sentences, and each of 
thess! judges has had extensive experi,ence with fede~-
view of capital cases. The chamii"an of the Committee, re-
tired Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., served as Cir-
cuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit while sitting on the 
Supreme Court. Professor Albert M. Pearson of the Uni-
versity of Georgia School of Law, who has experience repre-
senting defendants in capital cases, was the Reporter for the 
Committee. William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel of 
the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, served as 
Secretary. 
The Committee ;aet six times and considered with care the 
problems associate with coilateral review of capital sen-
tences. We invited written comments from a broad spec-
trum of interested parties and organizations, and received a 
number of helpful presentations. These included the views 
of state and federal prosecutors, groups urging abolition of 
the death penalty, state executives and legislators, and crimi-
nal defense and public defender organizations. The re-
· sponses contributed to our findings, which follow, and to the 
formulation of the legislation we propose. 
II . . Finding_s -
A. Unnecessary Delay and Repetition 
The Committee identified serious problems with the 
present system of collateral review. These may be broadly 
characterized under the heading of unnecessary dela~ and 
rfil?_etiron. The lack of coordination between the federal and 
state egal systems of ten results in inefficient and unnec-
essary steps in the course of litigation. Prisoners, for exam-
ple, often spend significant time moving back and forth be-
tween the federal and state systems in the process of 
exhausting state remedies. Frequent litigation over mo-
tions for stays of execution is another example of an unnec-
essary step in the process. Under current procedures, a 
prisoner has no incentive to move the collateral review eroc-














additional litigation over a request for a stay of execution is 
inevitable. 
The existing system also fosters piecemeal and repetitive 
litigation of claims. Because res judicata ~ int plicable to 
fwer;J habeas proceedings, many capital 1litigan s return to 
federal court with second-or even third and fourth-peti-
tions for relief. Current rules governing abuse of the writ 
and successive petitions have not served to prevent these 
;,,,.~~ 
endless filings. Another example of piecemeal litigation is • 
the fact that current rules allow at least three etitions for O ' ~ Li I L-
cert_iorari to the United States upreme ourt-after 1rect 1.ihi- ~r 
r~ , after state collateral proceedmgs, and after federal ~ f:"'•"-" 
collateral proceedings. S ,J-..k ~ 1-t...,_ 
Few would argue that the current state of death penalty ~ . 4..... 
administration is satisfactory. There are now approxi- fl-~ 
mately 2,200 convicted murderers on death row awaiting ~ t; I.., 
execution. Yet since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman de- ~ ~4.. ~ 
cision only 116 executions have taken place. The shortest plo wcA,""f .1 
of t~ese judicial proceedings required two years and nine 3, (!},,._ ~
months to complete. The longest covered a period of 14 +4A- : / 
years and six months. The length of the average proceeding 7c - Hr t; 
was ei,s:ht years~ ng two moIJths. The Committee does not CI~'-"'• ,. 
believe eight yearsare required for the appropriate habeas ( ~ ~ ) 
review of state criminal proceedings. -
The Committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of the time 
spent in,.collateral litigation '")n death penalty cases occurs out-
sigg of ~ ate co a eral proceedings. A table showing the "iv-
erage Tune perIOC!s and ratios in death penalty cases in these 
States is attached to thi1;, report. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well as the 
delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes clear 
that the present system of collateral review operates to frus-
trate the law of 37 States. 1 The collateral review process 
tends to be erratic and frequently is repetitious. The long 
1 Fed<f<tl l!j.W also provides for capital punishment in certain cases. See 
P. L. 1 0-690, 102 Stat. 4387 (Anti-Dru[ Abuse Act of 1988) (murders com-













separation of sentence and execution of ten hampers justice 
without improving the quality of adjudication. 2 This Com-
mittee believes that any serious reform proposal must ad-
dress the problems of delay and repetitive litigation. 
B. The Need for Counsel 
• rnn F2J7lllllt.-. 
A second serious problem with the current system is the 
~ 
pressing ~ for qualified counsel tp r~ resent inmates in 
collateral review. As the Supreme Court recently reaf-
firmea in m rray v. Giarratano, provision of counsel for 
criminal defendants is constitutionally required only for trial 
and direct appellate review. Because, as a practical matter, 
the focus of review in capital cases of ten shifts to collateral 
proceedings, the lack of adequate counsel creates severe 
problems. This situation is not likely to be remedied by the 
new provisions of the Anti-Dru_g_ Abuse Act of ,J.988 that re-
quire appointment of counsel in capital federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. 
Capital inmates almost uniformly are indigent, and of ten 
illiterate or uneducated. Capital habeas litigation may be 
difficult and complex. Prisoners acting pro se rarely present 
promptly or properly exhaust their constitutional challenges 
in the state forum. This results in delayed or ineffective fed-
eral collateral procedures. The end result is of ten appoint-
ment of qualified counsel only when an execution is immi-
nent. But at this stage, serious constitutional claims may 
have been waived. The belated entry of a lawyer, under se-
vere time pressure, does not do enough to ensure fairness. 
In sum, the Committee believes that provision of competent 
counsel for risoners under capital sentence throughout both 
state and federal co a era review 1s cruciaI"""toensuring 
fairness and protecting the constitutional rights of capital 
litigants. 
I V 
2 Contrary to what may be assumed, the Constitution does not provide H' -J / for federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions. The writ of 
A~• L fYV a-- habeas corpus available to state prisoners is not that mentioned in the 
F". ..Aul""I Constitution. It has evolved from a statute enacted by Congress in..1867, 
Sf.J>, ~O..,... now codified at 28 U.S. C. §~ . __, 
r:<,~.o-~ 
VI' :;...--- t , ~ ·z.:z.:('1-




















sults in delay and undermines the state interest in the finality 
of its criminal convictions. The Committee believes that the 
States would prefer to see post-conviction litigation go for-
ward in capital cases, even if that entails a minor subordina-
tion of their interest in comity as it is expressed in the ex-
haustion doctrine. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter except when a second or successive petition 
is filed. 
COMMENT: The premise of this subchapter is that a state 
prisoner under capital sentence is entitled to one opportunity 
for state and federal post-conviction review before being sub-
ject to execution. Consistent with this premise, the Com-
mittee believes that in a section 2254 proceeding, a state pris-
oner should be allowed to appeal from the district court to the 
court of appeals as a matter of right. With one exception, 
section 2260 eliminates the certificate of probable cause re-
quirement in cases to which this subchapter is applicable. 
The exception arises when a second or successive petition is 
filed. Even if such a petition is authorized under the provi-
sions of section 2257(c), the right to appeal in that instance 
will be governed by section 2253 rather than section 2260. 
lEPORT 
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(b) Upon the development of a complete evidentiary 
record, the district court shall rule on the merits of the claims 
properly before it. 
COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of federal 
review in capital cases to which this subchapter applies. It 
authorizes the district court to consider only those federal 
claims actually raised and litigated in the state courts. If the 
section 2254 petition presents no new claims, the district 
court will proceed to rule on the merits of the claims properly 
before it as long as the state evidentiary record and findings 
of fact are adequate. If they are deficient in any respect rec-
ognized under section 2254(d), the district court must com-
plete the evidentiary record before addressing the issues on 
the merits. To this extent, subsection (a) does not depart 
from existing law and practice. 
If a petitioner asserts a claim not previously presented to 
the state courts, the district court can consider the claim only 
if one of the three exceptions to the general rule listed in sub-
section (a)(l) is applicable. In that case, the district court 
must conduct an evidentiary hearing necessary to a full and 
fair consideration of the claim and in accordance with subsec-
tion (b) adjudicate it on the merits along with all other issues 
presented in the section 2254 petition. 
As far as new or "unexhausted" claims are concerned, sec-
tion 2259 represents a change in the exhaustion doctrine as 
articulated in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982). Section 
2259 bars such claims from consideration unless one of the 
subsection (a)(l) exceptions is applicable. The prisoner can-
not return to state court to exhaust even if he would like to 
do so. On the other hand, if a subsection (a)(l) exception is 
applicable, the district court is directed to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing and to rule on the new claim without first ex-
hausting state remedies as Rose v. Lundy now requires. 
Because of the existence of state procedural default rules, ex-
haustion is futile in the great majority of cases. It serves 









ing review by the court of last resort, the 180 day period be-
gins to run again if the capital sentence is undisturbed. The 
next step for the state prisoner is to file a section 2254 peti-
tion in federal district court. If counsel for the state pris-
oner properly discharges his responsibilities, default under 
the 180 day rule will not occur. 
In the event that counsel experiences some difficulty in fil-
ing a section 2254 petition on time, subsection (c) authorizes a 
60 day extension upon a showing of good cause in the federal 
district that would have jurisdiction over the section 2254 
petition when ultimately filed. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal 
review; district court adjudication. 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence 
files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this sub-
chapter applies, the district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
record for habeas corpus review based on the claims ac-
tually presented and litigated in the state courts except 
when the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop a claim in the state courts is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
Untied States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively ap-
plicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reason-
able diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing neces-
sary to complete the record for habeas corpus review. 
REPORT 
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2256, 2257 and 2258 is designed not to produce finality 
through procedural default but rather through a structured 
process of post-conviction litigation that brings all potentially 
meritorious claims to the attention of the state and federal 
courts before the imposition of the death penalty becomes 
legally permissible. 
There are several important tolling rules in section 2258. 
With one exception the filing period does not run after the 
filing of a section 2256(c) order as long as a capital case is 
pending for consideration before a court of competent juris-
diction. The policy underlying section 2258 is to encourage 
litigants to initiate the post-conviction review process and to 
keep it moving from stage to stage. If delay in the litigation 
process is due to slow judicial consideration of death penalty 
litigation, that time obviously should not be and is not 
counted in computing the 180 day period under section 2258. 
Under section 2258(a), the 180 day period is tolled when a 
state prisoner files a petition for certiorari in the Supreme 
Court after affirmance of his capital sentence on direct ap-
peal to the state court of last resort. It is extremely impor-
tant to recognize, as section 2258(b) makes clear, that there is 
no comparable tolling rule to permit the filing of certiorari 
petitions after state post-conviction review. The Commit-
tee believes that multiple opportunities for Supreme Court 
review are not essential to fairness in the consideration of 
capital cases. In this vein, it would point out that of the 106 
capital cases in which the Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari since 1972, only 2 came to the Court from state post-
conviction review. Elimination of this step does not result 
in disadvantage to the state prisoner, since all issues raised 
in state post-conviction review can be carried forward in 
a section 2254 petition and ultimately presented to the 
Supreme Court. 
The filing period is also tolled under section 2258(b) during 
any period that a capital case is pending for post-conviction 
review before a state court of competent jurisdiction. After 









jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good 
cause for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition 
within the 180 day period established by this section. 
COMMENT: Section 2258 requires a state prisoner under 
capital sentence to file a section 2254 petition within 180 days 
from the entry of an order under section 2256(c). In almost 
all cases, this will be an order appointing counsel to initiate 
state post-conviction review. But even if a state prisoner is 
not entitled to the appointment of counsel or simply rejects 
the State's offer of appointment, the 180 day period applies to 
all capital cases if the State is subject to this subchapter. 
In death penalty jurisdictions, the sole incentive for a pris-
oner to initiate post-conviction review is either the schedul-
ing of an execution date or the threat to schedule one. The 
disadvantages of this method of administering capital litiga-
tion persuaded the Committee to recommend the mandatory 
stay of execution provisions in section 2257. But it is clear 
that there must be some substitute mechanism to cause 
understandably reluctant state prisoners to seek post-
conviction review when such action may remove the only 
obstacle preventing the State from carrying out the death 
sentence. 
The entry of an order under section 2256(c) is such a substi-
tute. It begins the running of the filing period in capital liti-
gation. Unless the state prisoner actively litigates his case 
after his conviction and capital sentence have become final on 
direct appeal, he risks losing the right to file a section 2254 
petition in federal court. Thus, the 180 day filing require-
ment serves the state interest in promoting finality in capital 
cases. At the same time, this subchapter serves to advance 
that interest only if the State provides prisoners under capi-
tal sentence with the means-competent counsel at state ex-
pense-to assert their legal rights in state post-conviction 
proceedings. As stressed earlier, the interaction of sections 
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goes to the underlying guilt or innocence of the state prisoner 
under capital sentence. 
Section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time 
requirements; tolling rules. 
Any petition for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 
~
must be filed in the appropriate district court within 180 days 
from the filing in the appropriate state court of record of an 
order issued in compliance with section 2256(c). The time 
requirements established by this section shall be tolled: 
(a) From the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in 
the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the 
petition if a state prisoner seeks review of a capital sentence 
that has been affirmed on direct appeal by the court of last 
resort of the State or has otherwise become final for state law 
purposes. 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-convic-
tion review pending before a state court of competent juris-
diction; if all state filing rules are met in a timely manner, 
this period shall run continuously from the date that the state 
prisoner initially files for post-conviction review until final 
disposition of the case by the highest court of the State; 
provided, however, the tolling rule established by this sub-
section does not apply during the pendency of a petition for 
certiorari before the Supreme Court following such state 
post-conviction review. 
(c) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
counsel for the state prisoner: (1) moves for an extension 










tal sentence, it is the Committee's belief that federal review 
should end. 
In subsection (b)(3), the authority of a federal court to stay 
the execution of a state prisoner expires if there is a waiver 
of the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
2254. To eliminate doubt about the validity of the waiver, 
subsection (b)(3) requires that the prisoner announce the de-
cision before a court of competent jurisdiction and in the 
presence of his counsel. It also requires the court-which 
can be state or federal-to advise the prisoner of the conse-
quences of the waiver decision. 
After the occurrence of one of the conditions resulting in 
the expiration of the right to a mandatory stay of execution 
under subsection (b)(2) , federal review in capital cases pur-
suant to section 2254 is extremely limited. Subsection (c) 
would thereafter permit a stay of execution and the grant of 
relief in a capital case only if: (1) the claim has never been 
raised in state or federal court previously; (2) there is a valid 
excuse for not discovering and raising the claim during the 
prisoner's initial opportunity for state and federal post-
conviction review; and (3) the facts underlying the claim raise 
a serious doubt about the prisoner's guilt of the offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
The third of these conditions is clearly the most important. 
In the Committee's view, if there is any doubt about the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
state prisoner's initial attempt to obtain post-conviction re-
view. Often factual guilt is not seriously in dispute. Both 
the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive to ask 
whether all relevant information in mitigation of punishment 
was presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial 
was otherwise conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. 
Given the clear incentive to do this, the Committee does not 
believe that the federal courts should have to consider a sec-
ond petition under section 2254 which challenges only the 
sentencing phase in a capital case. As subsection (c) re--
fleets, the only appropriate exception is when the new claim 
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likely to be necessary. If a State takes the steps required 
in section 2256 to bring its capital litigation under this 
subchapter, there will be no reason to set an execution date 
until the completion of state and federal post-conviction 
review. At that juncture, the federal courts would have no 
authority to stay executions except under the very limited 
circumstances identified in section 2257(c). 
Subsection (b) establishes the duration of a stay of execu-
tion issued under this subchapter. In effect, it provides that 
a stay of execution issued under subsection (a) will remain in 
effect as long as state and federal post-conviction review in a 
capital case is being actively pursued by the state prisoner. 
The relationship between subsection (b)(l) and section 2258 
is particularly important. Under subsection (b)(l), a stay of 
execution remains in force as long as the state prisoner files 
a section 2254 petition in federal court within the 180 day 
period set forth in section 2258. It is important to empha-
size here that the object of the 180 day period established in 
section 2258-which includes the right to apply for a 60 day 
extension-is not to produce default. Rather it is one of a 
series of provisions in this subchapter designed to stimulate 
the orderly and expeditious consideration on the merits of all 
federal issues arising in capital cases. 
If a state prisoner files a petition under section 2254 within 
the time period set forth in section 2258, subsection (b)(2) 
extends the right to a stay of execution to include the entire 
period that the case is pending before the district court, the 
court of appeals, and the Supreme Court if a petition for cer-
tiorari is filed. The right to a stay would expire after the 
opportunity for Supreme Court review has passed or after 
the Supreme Court has considered a petition for certiorari 
and has denied the petition or disposed of the case without 
overturning the capital sentence. The Committee assumes 
that in capital cases the state prisoner will want to pursue 
every opportunity for federal post-conviction review open to 
him, including Supreme Court review. But once this review 











(2) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of ~---........ 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively appli-
cable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence in time to present the claim for state or federal 
post-conviction review; ang 
(3) The facts underlying the claim would be suffi-
cient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in 
the jury's determination of~ ?n the offense or of-
fenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
COMMENT: This subchapter rests on the assumption that 
ev:ery_ state pris<2ner under capital sentence should have one \ 
opportunity for full state and fe<!eral p_os!::,conviction ... review 
before being su ject o execution. Although this appears to 
have been the practice in capital cases since Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), it has never been formally recog-
nized as such. Many state prisoners under capital sentence 
have struggled to secure a stay of execution-often against 
the vigorous opposition of the State-before availing them-
selves of even one chance to pursue state and federal post-
conviction review. Stay of execution litigation often has 
been subject to tight deadlines, and places unrealistic de-
mands on judges, lawyers , and the prisoner. 
If applicable, section 2257 would eliminate stay of execu-
ti~ during a state prisoner's firs request for post-
conviction relieC" It provides for almandatoryS of execu-
tion in capital cases at any time following the appointment of 
counsel pursuant to section 2256(c). If an execution date has 
been set, the prisoner can obtain a stay as a matter of right 
simply by making application to any federal court that would 
have jurisdiction over the case in a proceeding brought under 
section 2254. In practice, however, even this step is not 
~J_~fu.u 
add_~~ 
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diction over any proceedings filed pursuant to section 2254. 
The application must recite that the State has invoked the 
post-conviction review procedures of this subchapter and 
that the scheduled execution is subject to stay. 
(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) 
~
shall expire if: -
(1) A state prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus peti-
tion under section 2254 within the -(ime ; equired in sec-
tion 2258; or 
(2)J tupon completion of district court and court of ap-
peals review under section 2254 the petition for relief is 
denied and (A) the time for filing a petition for certiorari 
has expired and no petition h'as been filed; (B) a timely 
petition for certiorari was filed and the Supreme Court 
denied the petition; or (C) a timely petition for certiorari 
was filed and upon consideration of the case, the 
Supreme Court disposed of it in a manner that left the 
capital sentence undisturbed; or 
(3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
presence of counsel and after having been advised of the 
consequences of his decision, a state prisoner under capi-
tal sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus 
review under section 2254. 
(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, 
no federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a 
stay of execution or grant relief in a capital case ~ : 
(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is a 













(d) would permit, though not require, continued representa-
tion if the prisoner and his counsel expressly make a request 
to t~.:tm(ttm.m.i:? authority established by the State. 
ubsection (e) rovides that the ineffectiveness -2! incom-
peten~_o _ _c__ounsel durin state er 1 o t-c n · · n re-
v~ n a capital case i o a ound for rehef m section 2254' /~ I-~ l~ 
proceedings. '-' This rule re ects settle constitut10na docJ $( ( r 
trine which limits ineffective as~stance of eounsel challenges / ,?-yvaA. 1!::-' ~ 
to those criminal proceedings to-which the Sixth Amendment ~f-~~ 
? right to counsel attaahes. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct  
2765 (1989), Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551 (1987). I-~ c:;.--
The Committee recognizes that the competence of counsel A-,; f ~ 
duringailstages of state and federal post-conviction review ~
is of the utmost importance in capital cases. However, as  • ~ 
far as federal review in a proceeding under section 2254 is ~ ,J JI'_/~ 
concerned, it believes that the focus should be on the er- U,,- - 0~ 
formance of a capital de en an s trial and appe ate counsel. ~ . _ L ..• ,,, 
The prov1s1on o counse under· tne new statute therefore + ~~· 
does not involve the creation of any potential claim of ineffec- ~ 
tive assistance of counsel in collateral review. The effective- .h~ A-~ 
ness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is a matter 1 ~ ~ v.LYl-f-that can and must be dealt with in the appointment process. 1/'r rr---- ' ,~- · 
Only one who has the clear ability and willingness to handle ~~ 
capital cases should be appointed under subsections (b) and ( . 
(c). If at any~ time during state or federal post-convic-
tion review it appears that appointed counsel is unable to dis-
charge his obligations in a timely and competent manner, the 
remedy is for the court to appoint a replacement, and to per-
mit post-conviction review to go forward. 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; 
limits on stays of execution; successive 
petitions. 
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate state cotg'._t___of_ 
record o~~rder pursuant to section 2256(c_Jfa warrant or 
order setting an ~tion date for a state prisoner sha1i--·-i:b::-e--..
1
,.....,...-=;===~---=;t-!-,-.--
stayed upon application to any court that would have juris- c/....aD...,  















oner's response to the offer of counsel. Judicial control of 
this process is necessary to establish a clear point in time to 
determine the applicability of sections 2257 and 2258. It is 
also necessary to assure that a full record exists showing 
which state prisoners have appointed counsel and which do 
not. 
Under (Slilisecti~ ll indigent state prisoners under 
capital seitt-enee-wc::rttld~ entitled to counsel in state J2.2.St-
conviction roe edi a mat er of ri ht. If an indigent 
prisoner is not competent to decide whetlier to accept or de-
cline the State's offer, the State must appoint counsel in any 
event. If a prisoner is not indigent, which would be the rare 
case, he would not be entitled to the appointment of counsel 
even if he accepted the State's offer. Finally, in some in-
stances, a prisoner might reject the offer of counsel. This 
rejection would become effective and binding only after a 
judicial inquiry into the prisoner's understanding of the 
leg~.sequences of his decision. 
:subsection (~ tablishes a rule requiring the appointment 
of~--- at the state post-conviction phase of capital 
litigation. The p~i~ I~ on for the rule is that during the 
post-conviction review, ineff'ective assistance of trial and ap-
pellate counsel is frequently a major issue. It would be un-
realistic to expect a capital defendant's trial ar5[p eliate 
counsel to raise a vigorous challenge to his own effectiveness. 
- ,--;_-::---,,-,-.,_ r-,,_..,..,.,--:-=--:----- • A se~ tria n a e ate counsel m 
deatn penalty cases serve under great pressure and of ten 
work themselves to the point of emotional and physical ex-
haustion. They are understandably less able to undertake a 
fresh and dispassionate consideration of the issues raised or 
possibly overlooked at trial and on direct appeal. The ap-
pointment of new counsel at the state habeas phase will do as 
much as can be done to overcome these difficulties. The 
Committee, however, did not believe the rule should be abso-
lute. In some cases, the prisoner under capital sentence 
may have such trust and confidence in his trial or appellate 
counsel that he would desire the attorney-client relationship 










prisoner to a single opportunity for federal habeas corpus re-
view under section 2254. This limitation would advance the 
state interest in the finality of criminal convictions and capi-
tal sentences. But to avail itself of subc ter B's more --=---~:.:::.::_~:..::.::.::~:___::,;-=-~=c------
StruCtured habeas corpus review procedures, a Sta~ould 
havL_to e~tablish a sy:ste for the a pointment and cpm.:: 
pens~~ unsel throughout a stages of 'state 
po¥_ conviction review. The purpose of tfos mec amsm 1s 
to assurethat collateral review will be fair, thorough, and 
the product of capable and committed advocacy. While 
subchapter B attempts to strike a realis_tic balance between 
the values of judicial efficiency and procedural fairness in the 
context of a federal system, it does not impose a solution on 
/ 
the States. Each State must assess the utility of subchapter 
1 
_ -,r. ~ 
B for itself. Unless a State takes the affirmative steps re- \ 5 ~ 
quired in sections 2256(b) and (c), its 1 1ga 10n o cap1 al cases ~ f-~ 
under section 2254 will be gover~utory and .______..__ ~
court rules that present! a ly to all federal habeas corpus ~ 
cases. _ ~ . , t, J5 
Central to efficacy of this scheme is the development of $,._.,/,_,-~ 
standards governing the competency of counsel chosen to 
serve in this specialized and demanding area of litigation. 
This mechanism is to be established by state statute or by 
rule of the state court of last resort. The Committee be-
lieves that it is more consistent with the federal-state balance 
to give the States · itude to establish a mechanism that 
complies wit subsection (o The final judgment as to the 
adeq~f an1~w-i:.:t.AfA-t1:1l' the appomtment of counsel under 
subsection (b), however, rests ultimately with the federal 
judiciary. If prisoners under capital sentence in a particular 
State doubt that a State's mechanism for appointing counsel 
comports with subsection (b), the adequacy of the system-as 
opposed to the competency of particular counsel-can be set-
tled through litigation. 
If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, the 
state mechanism must off er counsel to al~ state prisoners 
under capital sentence. In addition, it must provide for the 
entry of an appropriate judicial order based on the state pris-
~~~ 







~ ~ ,, 
10 
prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent and ac-
cepted the offer or is unable competently to decide whether 
to accept or reject the offer; (2) finding, after a hearing if 
necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and 
made the decision with an understanding of its legal conse-
quences; or (3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a 
finding that the prisoner is not indigent. 
(d) No counsel ~oi_!,lted pursuant to subsections (b) and - --(~o represent a state prisoner under capital sentence ,shall 
have previous! represented the prisoner at trialLOfr'-Q!L di-
re.ct appeal in the case for which the appointment is made un-
les";' the 
7
prisoner and counsel expressly request continued 
~ 
~~ 
/l,,-~~ J.::D • representation. 
✓~ .. J,.. ~ ~ (e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
~v,--- · state or federal collateral post-convictio~ roceedings in a 
1,1.,0~ 
l.,v\-- ~ ~'1r 1,-5'1.f 
capital case shall not be a _ground for relief in a proceeding 
arising under section 2254 or this subchapter. This limita-
tion shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel at 
any phase of state or federal post-conviction proceedings. 
COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of what 
would be new subchapter B, which establishes rules and pro-
cedures that apply solely to section 2254 cases involving pris-
oners under capital sentence. The aim of this subchapter is 
to provide a mechanism for the post-conviction litigation of 
capital cases that will enhance procedural safeguards for the 
prisoner and yet is less time consuming and less cumbersome 
from the viewpoint of the jurisdiction seeking to enforce its 
death penalty. There is no intent to alter the substantive 
scope of federal habeas corpus review under section 2254. 
S~r B offers an alternative to the present process 
of post-conviction review in capital ·cases. If it is applicable, 











CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions 
-------
[a proposed redesignation] 
·ons 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
apital Cases: Special Procedures 
[new] 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to cap-
ital sentence; appointment of counsel; 
requirement of rule of court or statute; 
procedures for appointment. 
(a) This su!;>cha~er shall apply to cases arising under sec-
tion 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It s~ll apply only if the provi-
sions of subsections (b) and (c) are sati fled. ---------- - -
(b) This subchapter is applicable 1 a tate establishes by . -------- A--------
rule of its court of last resort
1
or by statute,, a mechanism for 
the apI?,9intment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses ~( competent pounsel in state post-convic-
tio]_ £rgceedi¥ s brought by indigent prisoners whose capital 
convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal 
to the court of last resort in the Stat e or have otherwise be-
come final for state law purposes. The rule of court or stat-
ute must provide standards of competency for the appoint-
ment of such counsel. 
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation 
and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) 
n.--.-:s~4 













mus~ sel _!,o all st~ ners under capital sen-  4.--
tence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of ~ ~ 











fully by the federal courts. Thereafter, if no infirmity in the 
conviction has been found , judicial proceedings will be at an 
end, absent exceptional new developments. 
The Committee believes that its proposal will go far to rec-
tify the current chaos in capital litigation-periodic inactivity 
and last-minute frenzied activity, scheduling and reschedul-
ing of execution dates -which diminishes public confidence 
in the criminal justice system. In sum, adoption of this 
proposal will significantly enhance fairness in death penalty 
litigation. 
SUMMARY OF DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION STATISTICS 
BASED ON 50 CASES FROM FLORIDA, TEXAS, ALABAMA, 




End of state direct appeal 
Direct certiorari review by U. S. Supreme Court 
Execution ---
Valid sentence to: 
End of state direct appeals 







Sentence to cert on direct/sentence to execution 
Down time*/sentence to execution 
State collateral/sentence to execution 
Federal collateral/sentence to execution 
Total collateral/sentence to execution 
State collateral/total collateral 
Federal collateral/total collateral 




























Importantly, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
executiorf; which is to remain in place until federa.Ll:!fil.>eas 
proc~ Qg_§ are ~m__ple,ted, or until the prisoner has1'aITed to 
file a- allotted time. This automatic stay 
ensures that claims need not be evaluated under the time 
pressure of a scheduled execution. It should substantially 
eliminate the rushed litigation over stay motions that is trou-
bling for both litigants and the judiciary. 
Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will encom-
pas~ave been exhausted in state court. 
With the counsel rovided by the statute, there should be no 
excuse for ai ure to raise c aims m state court. The statute 
~ts :t'rorn current exhaustion practice by allowing for im-
mediate presentation of new claims in federal court in ex-
traordinary circumstances. In the event the entire coun-
seled state and federal collateral process concludes without 
relief being granted, the statute includes new mechanisms to 
promote finality. Subsequent and successive federal habeas 
petitions can no longer be the basis of a stay of execution 
or grant of relief absent ex~ordinary circu~stances and a 
colorable showing of factual innocence. - --~ 
IV. Conclusion 
The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system 
is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness requires 
that a defendant be provided a searching and impartial 
examination of his claims. Fairness also requires that if a 
defendant's claims are found to be devoid of merit after such 
examination, society is rightfully entitled to have the penalty 
prescribed by law carried out without unreasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to competent coun-
sel at state trial and appeal and, under recent congressional 
enactment, in federal habe "~ l"IT'T,.,._.., proceedings. The Com-
' r ~ -l ~JJ _ mitt~~ proposal s_eeks o fill a a;p )that now exists. by~ n-
w.>- ~ coura n the a omtme com et'ent counsel also m state ' ' "" ~ ;e,._._ 1 Lf,-- t,.- ha~e mgs. e proposa further as-
. ~ 0 ")'-(.~ sures that, upon completion of state proceedings, a defendant 
~ will have one opportunity to have his claims reviewed care-
~ s---1-~ ~
~ ~ ~.t-L ~J 
• 



















The Committee's proposal is aimed at achieving thi oal: · 
Capital cases shoul be su d c o one com e e an fair 
co_y.rse of co_llateral review in the sta e_w d federal s~ tem, 
free from the time pressure of impending executiorr;1tnd with, 
the assistance of co etent counsel for the defenctant. 
When this review has concluded, litigation should end. 
The specific operation of our proposed legislation 3 is de-
scribed in notes following each statutory section. Some gen-
eral comments are appropriate here. The proposal allows a 
State to bring capital litigation by its prisoners within the 
new statute by providing com~tent counsel f.w inmates on 
s.w.e-collateral review. Participa~ n tlie proposal is thu.;5 
fon with the States. Because 1t 1s 02t10nal, the proposal 
!3hou ause minimal intrusion on state J;erogatives. But 
for States that are concerned with delay in capital litigation, 
it is hoped that the procedural mechanisms we recommend 
will furnish an incentive to provide the counsel that are 
needed for fairness. 
L {vv µ.-- The statute provides for a six-month period within which 
~
;5 r t:,..,; • the federal habeas petition mu st be filed. The filing pe~iod 
· begins t~ only on the am)Ointment of cqynsel for the pris-
____.--; oner, or a refusal of the offer of counsel. The filing 12eriod 
.., • • J_ 1+(?-~ also ~ led during the pendency of all state court proceed-
(]) y<-fa- rd,,..,-- ings. In view of the provision for counsel, the tolling provi-
~/; ~,- sions, and the fact that the exhaustion requirement mandates 
/,,Al/~ {p ~ , n that the prisoner's federal petition present the same claims 
... J.,~ ~ ... .J~ ~ J ontained in the state petition, the six-month period ensures 
(>/V ~r -,_~- adequate time for the development and presentation of 
,l..~~~ claims. A further extension of time is available for cases 
~- ' · where good cause is shown. Although the time period may 
~ ') ~ _ seem short in view of the fact that no time limit whatsoever 
"-!;/ .,,,/4 ~ exists at present, it should be noted in comparison that six 
~ 
# months is far longer than the time provided for appeals in the 
' ~ state and federal systems, or for seeking certiorari review in 
~ JJ ~ the Supreme Court. 
~
$ "Our proposal would add a new Subchapter B dealing with Capital 
(>- ~ Cases. Sections 2241-2255 of Subchapter A will not be changed. We 
~ v refer to these changes simply as a proposed "statute" or as a "proposal. " 
L J,P':: ~ (r ~ rq~~ 
/ • 






















C. Last-Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is that 
litigation of constitutional claims of ten comes only when 
prompted by the setting of an execution date. Judicial 
resources are expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of 
execution in order to present his claims. Justice may be 
ill-served by conducting judicial proceedings in capital cases 
under the pressure of an impending execution. In some 
cases last-minute habeas corpus petitions have resulted from 
the unavailability of counsel at any earlier time. But in 
other cases attorneys appear to have intentionally delayed fil-
ing until time pressures were severe. In most cases, succes-
sive petitions are meritless, and we believe many are filed at 
the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a rational 
system of justice. The merits of capital cases should be re-
viewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time pres-
sure. This should be true both during state and federal col-
lateral review. But once this review has occurred, absent 
extraordinary circumstances there should be no further last-
minute litigation. 
III. The ~itteJLJ!roposal ~ In response to the problems described above, the Commit-
tee proposes new statutory procedures for federal habeas 
corp~s re~5ew of capital sentences 
1 
~J.1e~e cou~ @a_~en 
provided. Separate rocedures for ca 1taftises are appro- ,e_, U 
priate in light of t e special problems of capita htiga 10n. ~ 
Th~entives facing the capital litigant are unique. The in- h /1.t-j'i-~ 
mate under capital sentence, whose guilt frequently is never Yl-.,,__,J__/--J,. AA.1~ 
in question, has every incentive to delay the proceedings that / ~ y - --- --· - -
must take place before that sentence is carried out. Such an ~ ~  
inmate is avoiding the punishment prescribed by the law of ~~ 
the State. In contrast, prisoners serving an ordinary term / ____ _.;_ 
of years have every incentive to bring their claims to resolu-~ 
tion.as soon as possible in order to gam relief. And they are 
serving their sentences while litigation takes place. 
:EPORT 
4 
separation of sentence and execution of ten hampers justice 
without improving the quality of adjudication. 2 This Com-
mittee believes that any serious reform proposal must ad-
dress the problems of delay and repetitive litigation. 
B. The Needfor Counsel 
A second serious problem with the current system is the 
.~-+ _pressing ~l to represent inmates in 





A firmed in Murray v. Giarratano, provision of counsel for 
criminal defendants is constitutionall ~ r tr· al 
and direct aepe la_e review. ecause, as a prac 1cal mater, 
the focus of reviewin capital cases of ten shifts to collateral 
proceedings, the lack of adequate counsel creates severe 
problems. This situation is not likely to be remedied by the 
new provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 that re-
quire appointment of cou~el m capital federalnabeas corpus 
proceedings. 
Capital inmates almost uniformly are indigent, and of ten 
illiterate or uneducated. Capital habeas litigation may be 
difficult and complex. Prisoners acting pro se rarely present 
promptly or properly exhaust their constitutional challenges 
in the state forum. This results in delayed or ineffective fed-
eral collateral procedures. The end result is of ten appoint-
ment of qualified counsel only when an execution is immi-
nent. But at this stage, serious constitutional claims may 
have been waived. The belated entry of a lawyer, under se-
vere time pressure, does not do enough to ensure fairness. 
In sum, the Committee believes that provision of com2etent 1 
counsel for prisoners under capital sentence t~out both 
state and federal collateral review is crucial to ensuring 
fairness and protecting t e constitutional rights of capital 
litigants. 
2 Contrary to what may be assumed, the Constitution does not provide 
for federal habeas corpus review of state court dec1s10ns. The writ of 
ha eas corpus available o ate prisoners 1s not at mentioned in the 
Constitution. It has evolved from a statute enacted by Congress in 1867, 
now codified at 28 U. S. C. § 2254. 
s ~ ~ ~ ~ 
k 'kLb-1/~ . ~ -~~ 









additional litigation over a request for a stay of execution is 
inevitable. 
The existing system also fosters piecemeal and repetitive 
litigation of claims. Because res judicata is inapplicable to 
federal habeas proceedings, many capital litigants return to 
federal court with second-or even third and fourth-peti-
tions for relief. Current rules governing abuse of the writ 
and successive petitions have not served to prevent these 
endless filings. Another example of piecemeal litigation is 
the fact that current rules allow at least three petitions for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court-after direct 
review, after state collateral proceedings, and after federal 
collateral proceedings. 
Few would argue that the current state of death penalty 
adminis a · is satisfactory. There are now approxi-
mate! g._2,Q.0 onvicted murderers on death row awaiting 
executi ince the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman de-
cision onl 116 e ecutions have taken place. The shortest -of these ju · · proceedings required two years and nine 
months to complete. The longest covered a period of 14 
years and six months. The length of the average proceeding 
was eight ears an two onths. The Comrrtittee does not 
believe eig years a e equired for the appropriate habeas 
review of state criminal proceedings. 
The Committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 8Jr&_ of the time 
spent in collateral litigation in death penalty cases oc~ut-
sid~co~~:r:_oceedings . . -A table showing the av-
erage time periods and ratios in death penalty cases in these 
States is attached to this report. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well as the 
delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes clear 
that the present system of collateral review operates to frus-
tra~s. I The collateral review process 
tends to be erratic and frequently is repetitious. The long 
1 Federal law also provides for capital punishment in certain cases. See 
P. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4387 (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988) (murders com-
















in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have by far the greatest 
numbers of prisoners subject to capital sentences, and each of 
these judges has had extensive experience with federal re-
view of capital cases. The chairman of the Committee, re-
tired Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., served as Cir-
cuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit while sitting on the 
Supreme Court. Professor Albert M. Pearson of the Uni-
versity of Georgia School of Law, who has experience repre-
senting defendants in capital cases, was the Reporter for the 
Committee. William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel of 
the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, served as 
Secretary. 
The Committee met six times and considered with care the 
problems associated with collateral review of capital sen-
tences. We invited written comments from a broad spec-
trum of interested parties and organizations, and received a 
n~~resentations~ These included the views 
oflstate and fe~l prosecutors,:=groups urging ab,o.l:i-tj.~n of 
the death penaityfstate executives and legislators, ~ imi-
nal defense and public defender organizations. The re-
sponses contributed to our findings, which follow, and to the 
formulation of the legislation we propose. 
II. Findings 
A. Unnecessary Delay and Repetition 
The Committee identified ~rious ,._Qroblfil])s with the 
present system of collateral review. These may be broadly 
characterized under the heading of unnecessary delay and 
repetition: The lack of coordination between the federal and 
state legal systems of ten results in inefficient and unnec-
essary steps in the course of litigation. Prisoners, for exam-
ple, often spend significant time moving back and forth be-
tween the federal and state systems in the process of 
exhausting state remedies. Frequent litigation over mo-
tions for stays of execution is another example of an unnec-
essary step in the process. Under current procedures, a 
prisoner has no incentive to move the collateral review proc-









AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
IN CAPITAL CASES 
Committee Report 
I. Introduction 
Studies of public opinion establish that an overwhelming 
majority of our citizens favors the death penalty for certain 
murders. The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
evolving standards of decency embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment permit imposition of this punishment for some 
offenders. Of course, both the Court and society have rec-
ognized that, because it is irreversible, death is a unique pun-
ishment. This realization demands safeguards to ensure 
that capital punishment is administered with the utmost reli-
ability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-layered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review has led to piecemeal and repe-
titious litigation, and years of delay between sentencing and 
a judicial resolution as to whether the sentence was permissi-
ble under the law. The resulting lack of finality undermines 
public confidence in our criminal justice s stem. -Uf course, 
any system of review entai s some elay. It is not suggested 
that the delay needed for review of constitutional claims is 
inappropriate. But much of the delay inherent in the pres-
ent system is not needed for fairness. Adding to the prob-
lem is the fact that prisoners of ten cannot obtain qualified 
counsel until execution is imminent. The resulting last-
minute rushed litigation disserves inmates, and saps the re-
sources of our judiciary. 
To address these·problems, Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist formed this Committee in June 1988. His charge to us 
was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of legisla-
tion directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality" in 
capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been offered 
counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as members of this 
Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief 
Judge Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, District Judge Hodges 
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sults in delay and undermines the state interest in the finality 
of its criminal convictions. The Committee believes that the 
States would prefer to see post-conviction litigation go for-
ward in capital cases, even if that entails a minor subordina-
tion of their interest in comity as it is expressed in the ex-
haustion doctrine. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appea s ~ s 
n t a 1 to habeas cor us cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter except when a second or successive petition 
is filed. 
COMMENT: The premise of this subchapter is that a state 
prisoner under capital sentence i~ entitled to one op~ ity 
for state and federal 2ost-co ictio re ·ew before bemg sub-
jec to execution. Consistent with this premise, the Com-
mittee believes that in a section 2254 proceeding, a state pris-
oner should be allowed to appeal from the district court to the 
court of appeals as a matter of right. With one exception, 
section 2260 eliminates the certificate of probable cause re-
quirement in cases to which this subchapter is applicable. 
The exception arises when a second or successive petition is 
filed. Even if such a petition is authorized under the provi-
sions of section 2257(c), the right to appeal in that instance 
will be governed by section 2253 rather than section 2260. 
~EPORT 
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(b) Upon the development of a complete evidentiary 
record, the district court shall rule on the merits of the claims 
properly before it. 
COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of federal 
review in capital cases to which this subchapter applies. It 
authorizes the district court to consider only those federal 
claims actually raised and litigated in the state courts. If the 
section 2254 petition presents no new claims, the district 
court will proceed to rule on the merits of the claims properly 
before it as long as the state evidentiary record and findings 
of fact are adequate. If they are deficient in any respect rec-
ognized under section 2254(d), the district court must com-
plete the evidentiary record before addressing the issues on 
the merits. To this extent, subsection (a) does not depart 
from existing law and practice. 
If a petitioner asserts a claim not previously presented to 
the state courts, the district court can consider the claim only 
if one of the three exceptions to the general rule listed in sub-
section (a)(l) is applicable. In that case, the district court 
must conduct an evidentiary hearing necessary to a full and 
fair consideration of the claim and in accordance with subsec-
tion (b) adjudicate it on the merits along with all other issues 
presented in the section 2254 petition. 
As far as new or "unexhausted" claims are concerned, sec-
tion 2259 represents a change in the exhaustion doctrine as 
articulated in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982). Section 
2259 bars such claims from consideration unless one of the 
subsection (a)(l) exceptions is applicable. The prisoner can-
not return to state court to exhaust even if he would like to 
do so. On the other hand, if a subsection (a)(l) exception is 
applicable, the district court is directed to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing and to rule on the new claim without first ex-
hausting state remedies as Rose v. Lundy now requires. 
Because of the existence of state procedural default rules, ex-
haustion is futile in the great majority of cases. It serves 









ing review by the court of last resort, the 180 day period be-
gins to run again if the capital sentence is undisturbed. The 
next step for the state prisoner is to file a section 2254 peti-
tion in federal district court. If counsel for the state pris-
oner properly discharges his responsibilities, default under 
the 180 day rule will not occur. 
In the event that counsel experiences some difficulty in fil-
ing a section 2254 petition on time, subsection (c) authorizes a 
60 day extension upon a showing of good cause in the federal 
district that would have jurisdiction over the section 2254 
petition when ultimately filed. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal 
review; district court adjudication. 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence 
files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this sub-
chapter applies, the district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
record for habeas corpus review based on the claims ac-
tually presented and litigated in the state courts except 
when the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop a claim in the state courts is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
Untied States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively ap-
plicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reason-
able diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing neces-
sary to complete the record for habeas corpus review. 
lEPORT 
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2256, 2257 and 2258 is designed not to produce finality 
through procedural default but rather through a structured 
process of post-conviction litigation that brings all potentially 
meritorious claims to the attention of the state and federal 
courts before the imposition of the death penalty becomes 
legally permissible. 
There are several important tolling rules in section 2258. 
With one exception the filing period does not run after the 
filing of a section 2256(c) order as long as a capital case is 
pending for consideration before a court of competent juris-
diction. The policy underlying section 2258 is to encourage 
litigants to initiate the post-conviction review process and to 
keep it moving from stage to stage. If delay in the litigation 
process is due to slow judicial consideration of death penalty 
litigation, that time obviously should not be and is not 
counted in computing the 180 day period under section 2258. 
Under section 2258(a), the 180 day period is tolled when a 
state prisoner files a petition for certiorari in the Supreme 
Court after affirmance of his capital sentence on direct ap-
peal to the state court of last resort. It is extremely impor-
tant to recognize, as section 2258(b) makes clear, that there is 
no comparable tolling rule to permit the filing of certiorari 
petitions after state post-conviction review. The Commit-
tee believes that multiple opportunities for Supreme Court 
review are not essential to fairness in the consideration of 
capital cases. In this vein, it would point out that of the 106 
capital cases in which the Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari since 1972, only 2 came to the Court from state post-
conviction review. Elimination of this step does not result 
in disadvantage to the state prisoner, since all issues raised 
in state post-conviction review can be carried forward in 
a section 2254 petition and ultimately presented to the 
Supreme Court. 
The filing period is also tolled under section 2258(b) during 
any period that a capital case is pending for post-conviction 
review before a state court of competent jurisdiction. After 










jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good 
cause for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition 
within the 180 day period established by this section. 
COMMENT: Section 2258 requires a state prisoner under 
capital sentence to file a section 2254 petition within 180 days 
from the entry of an order under section 2256(c). In almost 
all cases, this will be an order appointing counsel to initiate 
state post-conviction review. But even if a state prisoner is 
not entitled to the appointment of counsel or simply rejects 
the State's offer of appointment, the 180 day period applies to 
all capital cases if the State is subject to this subchapter. 
In death penalty jurisdictions, the sole incentive r a ris-
oner to initiate 11ost-conviction review 1s either the sche ul-
ing or an ex~~ d~ o?°the1hreat to schedule one. - The 
disadvantages ofthis inetfiod of administering capital litiga-
tion persuaded the Committee to recommend the mandatory 
stay of execution provisions in section 2257. But it is clear 
that there must be some substitute mechanism to cause 
understandably reluctant state prisoners to seek post-
conviction review when such action may remove the only 
obstacle preventing the State from carrying out the death 
sentence. 
The entry of an order under section 2256(c) is such a substi-
tute. It begins the running of the filing period in capital liti-
gation. Unless the state prisoner actively litigates his case 
after his conviction and capital sentence have become final on 
direct appeal, he risks losing the right to file a section 2254 
petition in federal court. Thus, the 180 day filing require-
ment serves the state interest in promoting finality in capital 
cases. At the same time, this subchapter serves ~o ad~ nce 
that inter~ t only if the State provides prisoners under capi-
tv ente~ with the 1,;1e_ans-competent counseI at state ex-
pense-to assert 'tne1r ,l.~aL rights in state post-conviction 






goes to the underlying guilt or innocence of the state prisoner 
under capital sentence. 
Section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time 
requirements; tolling rules. 
Any ~ t~tion for habeas corrms relief under section 2254 
..-.-
must be filed in the appropriate district court within 180 days - .. , 
from the filing in the appropriate state court of rec~ d of an 
order issued in compliance with section 2256(c). The time 
requirements established by this section shall be tolled: 
(a) From the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in --- ......... .._, 
the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the 
petition if a state prisoner seeks review of a capital sentence 
that has been affirmed on direct appeal by the court of last 
resort of the State or has otherwise become final for state law 
purposes. 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-convic-
tion review pending before a state court of competent juris-
diction; if all state filing rules are met in a timely manner, 
this period shall run continuously from the date that the state 
prisoner initially files for post-conviction review until final 
disposition of the case by the highest court of the State; 
provided, however, the tolling rule established by this sub-
section does not apply during the pendency of a petition for 
certiorari before the Supreme Court following such state 
post-conviction review. 
(c) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
aw= ~... ~ pfl ~ 
counsel for the state prisoner: (1) moves for an extension 









tal sentence, it is the Committee's belief that federal review 
should end. 
In subsection (b)(3), the authority of a federal court to stay 
the execution of a state prisoner expires if there is a waiver 
of the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
2254. To eliminate doubt about the validity of the waiver, 
subsection (b)(3) requires that the prisoner announce the de-
cision before a court of competent jurisdiction and in the 
presence of his counsel. It also requires the court-which 
can be state or federal-to advise the prisoner of the conse-
quences of the waiver decision. 
After the occurrence of one of the conditions resulting in 
the expiration of the right to a mandatory stay of execution 
under subsection (b)(2), federal review in capital cases pur-
suant to section 2254 is extremely limited. 8._!::'.bsection (c) 
would thereafter permit a stay of execution and the grant of 
relief in a capital case @!y if: (1) the claim has never been 
raised in state or federafcourt previously; (2) there is a valid 
excuse for not discovering and raising the claim during the 
prisoner's initial opportunity for state and federal post-
conviction review; and (3) the facts underlying the claim raise J 
a serious doubt about the prisoner's guilt of the offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
The third of these conditions is clearly the most important. 
In the Committee's view, if there is any doubt about the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
st~ :gr1so~ s_initial ~ttemj>t to obtain post-conviction re-
view. Oftenfadual gu1tt isnot seriously in dispute. Both 
the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive to ask 
whether all relevant information in mitigation of punishment 
was presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial 
was otherwise conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. 
Given the clear incentive to do this, the Committee does not -believe that the federal courts should have to consider a sec-
Ol!d pm1tiqntina"er "'s"ecHon ~ 4 whi~challen~es, only Tue 
sentencing phase in a capital case. As subsection (c) ; e-
flec'ts , the o@y appropriate exception is when the new claim 










likely to be necessary. If a State takes the steps required 
in section 2256 to bring its capital litigation under this 
subchapter, there will be no reason to set an execution date 
until the completion of state and federal post-conviction 
review. At that juncture, the federal courts would have no 
authority to stay executions except under the very limited 
circumstances identified in section 2257(c). 
Subsection (b) establishes the duration of a stay of execu-
tion issued under this subchapter. In effect, it provides that 
a stay of execution issued under subsection (a) will remain in 
effect as long as state and federal post-conviction review in a 
capital case is being actively pursued by the state prisoner. 
The relationship between subsection (b)(l) and section 2258 
is particularly important. Under subsection (b)(l), a stay of 
execution remains in force as long as the state prisoner files 
a section 2254 petition in federal court within the 180 day 
period set forth in section 2258. It is important to empha-
size here that the object of the 180 day period established in 
section 2258-which includes the right to apply for a 60 day 
extension-is not to produce default. Rather it is one of a 
series of provisions in this subchapter designed to stimulate 
the orderly and expeditious consideration on the merits of all 
federal issues arising in capital cases. 
If a state prisoner files a petition under section 2254 within 
the time period set forth in section 2258, subsection (b)(2) 
extends the right to a stay of execution to include the entire 
period that the case is pending before the district court, the 
court of appeals, and the Supreme Court if a petition for cer-
tiorari is filed. The right to a stay would expire after the 
opportunity for Supreme Court review has passed or after 
the Supreme Court has considered a petition for certiorari 
and has denied the petition or disposed of the case without 
overturning the capital sentence. The Committee assumes 
that in capital cases the state prisoner will want to pursue 
every opportunity for federal post-conviction review open to 
him, including Supreme Court review. But once this review 









(2) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively appli-
cable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence in time to present the claim for state or federal 
post-conviction review; and . , . ~ I~ 
( C ) (3) The facts underlying the claim would be suffi~ J ~ G-k . ./1) 
cient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in ~ "/ ~ )<3) 
the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or of- J ~ '1 
fenses for which the death penalty was imposed. · 
COMMENT: This subchapter rests on the assumption that 
every state risoner under capital sentence should have one 
opportunity or full state an ederal post-conviction review 
before being subject to execution. A oug t 1s appears to 
have been the practice in capital cases since Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), it has never been formally recog-
nized as such. Many state prisoners under capital sentence 
have struggled to secure a stay of execution-often against 
the vigorous opposition of the State-before availing them-
selves of even one chance to pursue state and federal post-
conviction review. Stay of execution litigation often has 
been subject to tight deadlines, and places unrealistic de-
mands on judges, lawyers, and the prisoner. 
If applicable, section 2257 would eliminate stay of execu-
tion litigation during a state prisoner's first request for post-
conviction relief. It provides for a mandatory stay of execu-
tion in capital cases at any time following the appointment of 
counsel pursuant to section 2256(c). If an execution date has 
been set, the prisoner can obtain a stay as a matter of right 
simply by making application to any federal court that would 
have jurisdiction over the case in a proceeding brought under 
section 2254. In practice, however, even this step is not 
I W-L ~ ~
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diction over any proceedings filed pursuant to section 2254. 
The application must recite that the State has invoked the 
post-conviction review procedures of this subchapter and 
that the scheduled execution is subject to stay. 
(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall expire jf: -(1) A state prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus peti-
tion under section 2254 within the time required in sec-
tion 2258; or 
(2) Upon completion of district court and court of ap-
peals review under section 2254 the petition for relief is 
denied and (A) the time for filing a petition for certiorari 
has expired and no petition has been filed; (B) a timely 
petition for certiorari was filed and the Supreme Court 
denied the petition; or (C) a timely petition for certiorari 
was filed and upon consideration of the case, the 
Supreme Court disposed of it in a manner that left the 
capital sentence undisturbed; or 
(3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
presence of counsel and after having been advised of the 
consequences of his decision, a state prisoner under capi-
tal sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus 
review under section 2254. 
~ 
(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, ... - - -- -
no federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a 
stay of execution or grant relief in a capital case unless: 
(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is a 













(d) would permit, though not require, continued representa-
tion if the prisoner and his counsel expressly make a request 
to the appointing authority established by the State. 
Subsection (e) provides that the ineffectiveness or incom-
petence of counsel during stat ~ re-
view in a capital case 1s not a groun,d for relief in section 2254 
proceedings. This rule reflects settled constitutionar doc-
triMWhich limits ineffective assistance of counsel challenges 
to those criminal procee ings to whic the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches. VAfurray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 
2765 (1989), Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551 (1987). 
The Committee recognizes that the competence of counsel 
during all stages of state and federal post-conviction review 
is of the utmost importance in capital cases. However, as 
far as federal review in a proceeding under section 2254 is 
----·--;-;:---~ -;-''--;-;-- ..--~~- ~ -,-- -
COnS-filJled, it believes that the f er-
formance of a ca ital defendant's trial and appellate counsel. 
The provision of counse under the new statute therefore 
does not involve the creation of any potential claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in collateral review. The effective-
ness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is a matter 
that can and must be dealt with in the appointment process. 
Only one who has the clear ability and willingness to handle 
capital cases should be appointed under subsections (b) and 
(c). If at any any time during state or federal post-convic-
tion review it appears that appointed counsel is unable to dis-
charge his obligations in a timely and competent manner, the 
remedy is for the court to appoint a replacement, and to per-
mit post-conviction review to go forward. 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; 
limits on stays of execution; successive 
petitions. 
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate state court of 
record of an order pursuant to section 22~6(c), a warrant or 
order setting an execution date for a state prisoner shall be 





























oner's response to the offer of counsel. Judicial control of 
this process is necessary to establish a clear point in time to 
determine the applicability of sections 2257 and 2258. It is 
also necessary to assure that a full record exists showing 
which state prisoners have appointed counsel and which do 
not. 
Und~ (c), all indigent state risoners under 
capital sentence would be entitle to counse in state post-
conviction proceedfngs asamatter of r ignt. If an indigent 
prisoner 1s not competent to ecide whether to accept or de-
cline the State's offer, the State must appoint counsel in any 
event. If a prisoner is not indigent, which would be the rare 
case, he would not be entitled to the appointment of counsel 
even if he accepted the State's offer. Finally, in some in-
stances, a prisoner might reject the offer of counsel. This 
rejection would become effective and binding only after a 
judicial inquiry into the prisoner's understanding of the 
legal consequences of his decision. 
Subsection (d) establishes a rule requiring the appointment 
_ A ?-~ of new,__ cou~ el at the state post-conviction phase of capital 
~~ .w _ ,.A litigation. The primary reason for the rule is that during the 
~ "'post-conviction review, ineffective assistance of trial and ap-
:::-- pellate counsel is frequently a major issue. It would be un-
realistic to expect a capital defendant's trial or appellate 
counsel to raise a vigorous challenge to his own effectiveness. 
A secondary reason is that trial and appellate counsel in 
death penalty cases serve under great pressure and of ten 
work themselves to the point of emotional and physical ex-
haustion. They are understandably less able to undertake a 
fresh and dispassionate consideration of the issues raised or 
possibly overlooked at trial and on direct appeal. The ap-
pointment of new counsel at the state habeas phase will do as 
much as can be done to overcome these difficulties. The 
Committee, however, did not believe the rule should be abso-
lute. In some cases, the prisoner under capital sentence 
may have such trust and confidence in his trial or appellate 
counsel that he would desire the attorney-client relationship 
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prisoner to a si~ opportunit_y for federal habeas corpus re-
vi~54. This limitation would advance the 
state interest in the finality of criminal convictions and capi-
tal sentences. But to avail itself of subchapter B's more 
structured habeas corpus review procedures, a State would 
have to establish a system for the appointment and com-
pensation o m n co se roug out a s ages o state 
pos con~c 10n review. he purpose of thf?mect anism is 
to assuretliat c'oibneral review will be fair, thorough, and 
the product of ca able and committed advocacy. While 
subchapter B attempts to strike a realistic balance between 
the values of judicial efficiency and procedural fairness in the 
t t ... \ 
context of a federal system, it do~ a solution on - -the~es. Each State must assess the utility of subchapter 
B for itself. Unless a State takes the affirmative steps re-
quired in sections 2256(b) and (c), its litigation of capital cases 
under section 2254 will be governed by the statutory and 
court rules that presently apply to all federal habeas corpus 
cases. 
Central to efficacy of this scheme is the development of 
standards governing the competency of counsel chosen to 
serve in this specialized and demanding area of litigation. 
This mechanism is to be established by state statute or by 
rule of the state court of last resort. The Committee be-
lieves that it is more consistent with the federal-state balance 
to give the States wide latitude to establish a mechanism that 
complies ~n ). e firial judgment as to the 
adequacyofanysysternfor the appointment of counsel under 
subsection (b), however, rests ultimately with the federal 
judiciary. If prisoners under capital sentence in a particular 
State doubt that a State's mechanism for appointing counsel 
comports with subsection (b), the adequacy of the system-as 
opposed to the competency of particular counsel-can be set-
tled through litigation. 
If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, the 
state mechanism must offer counsel to all state prisoners 
under cap1 a sentence. In addition, it must provide for the 
~
entry of an appropriate judicial order based on the state pris-










prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent and ac-
cepted the offer or is unable competently to decide whether 
to accept or reject the offer; (2) finding, after a hearing if 
necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and 
made the decision with an understanding of its legal conse-
quences; or (3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a 
finding that the prisoner is not indigent. 
(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and 
(c) to represent a state prisoner under capital sentence shall 
have previously represented the prisoner at trial or on di-
rect appeal in the case for which the appointment is made un-
less the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued 
~/- representation. 
 (e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
~ ~ state or federal collateral post-conviction proceedings in a 
~ ~ capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding 
4- arising under section 2254 or this subchapter. This limita-
~ tion shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel at 
any phase of state or federal post-conviction proceedings. 
COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of what 
would be new subchapter B, which establishes rules and pro-
cedures that apply solely to section 2254 cases involving pris-
oners under capital sentence. The aim of this subchapter is 
to provide a mechanism for the post-conviction liti a'tion of 
c~pita Cg,§es at will enhance procedural safeguards for the 
prisoner and yet is less time consuming and less cumbersome 
from the viewpoint of the jurisdiction seeking to enforce its 
death penalty. There is no intent to alter the substantive 
scope of federal habeas corpus review under section 2254. 
I f , ,~ 
Subchapter B offers an alternative to the present process 
of post-cont iction review fo capital cases. If it is applicable, 
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CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions 
[a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
Subchapter B. Capital Cases: Special Procedures ~ a_/-/ , 
- [new]  o-f sf-~ 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to cap-
ital sentence; appointment of counsel; 
requirement of rule of court or statute; 
procedures for appointment. 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under sec-
tion 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It shall a£ply gply if the provi-
sions of subsections (b) and (c) are ~~~~ed. 
(b) This subchapter is applicable ifaState establishes by ,.., 
rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 
the appointment1 c~ n and payment of reasonaj:>le 
liti[ation exp~ es of co~ petent couns~ in ~ e post-convic-
tion m:9ceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital ~= 
convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal 
to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise be-
come final for state law purposes. The rule of court or stat-
ute must provide standards of competency for the appoint-
ment of such counsel. 
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation 
and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) -must offer counsel to all state prisoners under capital sen-
tence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of 
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fully by the federal courts. Thereafter, if no infirmity in the 
conviction has been found, judicial proceedings will be at an 
end, absent exceptional new developments. 
The Committee believes that its proposal will go far to rec-
tify the current chaos in capital litigation-periodic inactivity 
and last-minute frenzied activity, scheduling and reschedul-
ing of execution dates -which diminishes public confidence 
in the criminal justice system. In sum, adoption of this 
proposal will significantly enhance fairness in death penalty 
litigation. 
SUMMARY OF DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION STATISTICS 
BASED ON 50 CASES FROM FLORIDA, TEXAS, ALABAMA, 
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Importantly, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
execution, which is to remain in place until Tederal ha beas 
proceedings are~completed, or until the prisoner has failed to 
file a petition within the allotted time. This automatic stay 
ensures that claims need not be evaluated under the time 
pressure of a scheduled execution. It should substantially 
eliminate the rushed litigation over stay motions that is trou-
bling for both litigants and the judiciary. 
Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will encom-
pass only claims that have been exhaustedi n stare= court. 
Wi tfi tfi"ecou'nsefprovict"ect"6ytlie"statut"e, tlieresl'i'ob'rcr~ no 
excuse for ail raise claims in state court. The statlrte 
departs om current e a 1 c allowing for im-
mediate presentation of new claims in federal court in ex-
traordinary circumstances. In the event the entire coun-
seled state and federal collateral process concludes without 
relief being granted, the statute includes new mechanisms to 
promote finality. Subsequent and successive federal habeas \ 
petitions can no longer be the basis of a stay of execution 
or grant of relief absent extraordinary circumstances and a 
colorable showing of factual innocence. 
IV. Conclusion 
The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system 
is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness requires 
that a defendant be provided a searching and impartial 
examination of his claims. Fairness also requires that if a 
defendant's claims are found to be devoid of merit after such 
examination, society is rightfully entitled to have the penalty -prescribed by law carried out without unreasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to competent coun-
sel at state trial and appeal and, under recent congressional 
enactment, in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Com--
mi! tee's pro2_osal seeks to fill J!.2P that now exist~ -
coura~ ns the a~ ointment of ci_m2_etent counsel also in state 
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The Committee's proposal is aimed at achieving this goal: 
Capital c:,,ses should be 1a1bject to one comRlete and fair 
co~ or'c~ lateral revie_;Y in the state ~ d federal s~ tem, 
free from the tfme pre~ ure ofimpencling execution, an with 
the ~ sistance of comEete.Et counsel for the defendant. 
Whenfliis review has conc!"iiTea,"1W.gation should end. 
... ~ The specific operation of our proposed legislation 3 is de-
C>-,,,c;,,- r-v,.- scribed in notes following each statutory section. Some gen-
~ eral comments are appropriate here. The proposal ~ a 
~ State to bring capital litigation by its prisoners within the 
~ new statute y prov1 m compe en counse or inmates on 
~ ita'te Ciillafera review. Par 1c1pa\Jon in the pi'oposal is thus 
J,,o ot{~tes. Because it is optional, the proposal 
~ s oul cause minimal intrusion on state prerogatives. But 
MA,,,.- S' I ~ - for States that are concerned with delay in capital litigation, 
/;j,,,.~ . ..,,,,._, •~/..,it is hoped that the procedural mechanisms we recommend 
V _... ~ will furnish an inc tiv to rovide the counsel that are 
•~~ ~~needed for airness. 
,r'--  The statute provides for a six-month period within which 
~ ,._,,,,~  the' tederal habeas petition ~must be filed. The filing period 
L,,.,- beginst o ~ e appointment of counsel for the pris-
/f' ·. ~ oner, or a refusal of the offer of counsel. The filing period 
/,,,,, ~ ~ also is tolled dt!!jpg th~ pendency of all state co~roceed-
~ s. In view of the provi~ ounsel, the to mg provi-
~ sions, and the fact that the exhaustion reg!!ireme,.t1t mandates 
~ ,:;- that the prisoner's federal petition resent the same claims .IJIIII contained in the state petition, the ix-month period ensures 
L I.bl • _ __J. adequate time for the developm nt and presentation of 
rJ ~~ claims. A further extension of t' e is available for cases 
. where good cause is shown. Alt ugh the time period may 
,-,AK~ -- seem short in view of the fact th no time limit whatsoever 
exists at present, it should be ted in comparison that six 
months is far longer than the ti e provided for appeals in 1Jie 
state and e era systems, or r seekmg ce 10rari review in 
the Supreme Court. 
3 Our proposal would add t new Subchapter B dealing with Capital 
Cases. Sections 2241-2255 f Subchapter A will not be changed. We 
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C. Last-Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is that 
litigation of constitutional claims of ten comes only when 
prompted by the setting of an execution date. Judicial 
resources are expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of 
execution in order to present his claims. Justice may be 
ill-served by conducting judicial proceedings in capital cases 
under the pressure of an impending execution. In some 
cases last-minute habeas corpus petitions have resulted from 
the unavailability of counsel at ani earlier time. But in 
?tl\\r c~se_s attorneys al?Pear t~i,n1&~l,ll d,!!~fil-
mg until t!me pressuf[s W,$r~ seyere. In most cases, succes-
sive petffions are merilless, and~ e believe many are filed at 
the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a rational 
system of justice. The merits of capital cases should be re-
viewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time pres-
sure. This should be true both during state and federal col-
lateral review. But once this review has occurred, absent 
extraordinary circumstances there should be no further last-
minute litigation. 
III. The Committee Prop_osal -
In response to the problems described above, the Commit-
tee proposes new statutory procedures for federal habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences where counsel has been 
provided. Separate procedures for capital cases are appro-
priate in light of the special problems of capital litigation. 
The incentjveuaci~ the caEital litigant are unigue. The in-
mate under capital sentence, whose guilt frequently is never 
in question, has every incentive to delay the proceedings that 
must take place before that sentence is carried out. Such an 
inmate is avoiding the punishment prescribed by the law of 
the State. In contrast, prisoners serving an ordinary term 
of years have every incentive to bring their claims to resolu-
tion as soon as possible in order to gain relief. And they are 
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